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ABSTRACT 
Title of Dissertation:          Economics of Maritime Environmental Regulations on 
                                           Oil Pollution Liability: Linking Theory to Practice 
 
Degree:                                                     MSc 
 
This dissertation is a study of the oil pollution liability regime by analyzing the 
regulation of tanker-source accident pollution from the perspective of the economic 
interests in terms of the examining of the key international regulations complied by 
several countries of the world.  
 
A brief review is made of the historical evolution of the oil pollution liability 
convention based on the literature review of a various sources as a potential 
requirement to conduct economics analysis of maritime environmental regulations, in 
particular to the choice of oil pollution liability policy in one country. 
 
The changes in the world oil seaborne trade, in particular the development of 
relevant IMO conventions on the oil pollution triggered by increasing occurrences of 
tanker casualties through the years has echoed a parallel change in tanker accident’s 
rate and oil spill with the change of world tanker fleet. 
 
The legal framework of the oil pollution liability regime is detailed discussed based 
on the evolution of the international conventions such as CLC/Fund, which bring out 
some special features, for instance, the property rights in the claims for the 
environmental damage. 
 
The theoretical framework of economic analysis of oil pollution liability is 
highlighted, in particular, by the basic economic model of the demand and supply in 
oil shipping market. In essence, it analyses the relationship between the economic 
system and the maritime environment system and additionally, the regulation 
framework that determines the choice of oil pollution liability regime in major oil 
importing countries of the world. Following this chapter, the liability options among 
US, Japan and China are addressed. 
 
The final chapter concludes the elasticity of oil supply and demand and the 
competitiveness of shipping markets are key factors affecting liability policy. 
 
KEYWORDS: Oil Pollution, Economy, Environment 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
 
During the last few decades the oil pollution of the world’s oceans has become a 
matter of increasing international concern1. The United Nations concludes that the 
vast majority of oil pollution is from domestic car oil use and run off from land-based 
sources, and municipal and industrial waste sites. Nevertheless, the most important 
pollutant resulting from shipping and maritime activities is oil. According to UNEP 
research, about 5 percent of oil pollution in oceans is due to tanker accidents2. 
 
Although this may contribute a comparatively small percentage of the total oil 
entering the sea in a year, the consequences of an accident can be disastrous to the 
immediate area, particularly if the tanker involved is a large one and the accident 
occurs close to the coast. The wrecks of the Torrey Canyon (1967), the Exxon 
Valdez (1989), the Erika (1999) and the Prestige (2002) are examples. Presently, 
the oceans remain the primary viaduct for the conduct of world trade. In the long 
term, the global reliance on oil as the primary source of energy will result in ever-
increasing volumes of oil being transported by tankers across the oceans.3
 
In the realm of marine pollution regulation, the most prolific law-making and 
regulatory body is the London-based International Maritime Organization (IMO), the 
                                                 
1 The IMO has recognized the vital of oil pollution since 1959. See “Preventing marine pollution”, 
focus on IMO, March 1998, at http://www.imo.org. 
2 The UN has also recognized the marine pollution and a research of UNEP in 1990 concludes the 
different sources to the ocean, at http://www.cep.unep.org/issues/ibsp.html#Oil . 
3 World oil demand grew substantially in the 1990s, even though growth slowed from 2000 to 2002, 
see Fearnleys 2004, at p.4. For the view that maritime oil pollution can be directly traced to the 
prominence of petroleum in the industrialised worlds’ economies, see B. Shaw et al., The Global 
Environment: A Proposal to Eliminate Marine Oil Pollution, 27 Nat. Resources J. 157 (1987). 
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United Nations specialised agency tasked with the mandate of regulating maritime 
safety and marine environmental protection. Indeed, it forms part of that 
international conventions of environment consciousness which has captured world 
attention in the past five decades or so and which figures so prominently in the 
politics of international discourse today. Prevention of ship-source oil pollution has 
been an international regulatory goal since 1954, giving rise to various conventions, 
resolutions and codes developed under the auspices of the IMO. Among these 
regulations, they could be divided into several areas: preventing operational oil 
pollution like MARPOL 73/78, preventing accidental pollution like SOLAS, reducing 
the consequence of accidents like OPRC and providing compensation for pollution, 
such as the CLC, Fund and Supplementary Fund conventions.4  
 
As far as maritime environmental regulations on oil pollution liability regime is 
concerned, only the final area that provides compensation for pollution is concerned 
in this research. In recent years, the frequent occurrences of tanker oil pollution 
incidents have raised questions as to whether the compensation standard is suitable 
for the oil spill damage. Oil compensation standards in maritime transport, as well as 
in other sectors, are normally subject to specific rules and regulations, such as CLC 
and Fund. In addition, there regulations are mostly made by national or international 
governmental organizations rather than by shipping industries themselves or any 
other professional bodies. As far as who pay the damages is concerned, there are 
shipowners and cargo owners involved in the oil pollution compensation. First of all, 
consistent with the ‘polluter pays’ principle, shipowners are now regarded as the 
primary polluter by virtue of his direct operational role in transporting cargos that are 
potential pollutants in the maritime transport sectors. Furthermore, many states have 
generally sought to shift the costs of environmental compliance to industry. Thus, 
regulators have tried to impose responsibility on cargo owners based on the 
argument that the owners of polluting cargoes must share in the costs of preventive 
and remedial action as well as of compensation to pollution victims.5
 
                                                 
4 See Focus on IMO, “Tanker safety: the work of the International Maritime Organization”, at 
http://www.imo.org
5 See Alan Khee-Jin Tan. “Vessel-source Marine Pollution”, Cambridge University Publishing, 2006, 
at p.38. 
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As far as the oil spill damage scope is concerned, the civil liability regime for marine 
oil pollution was the first international liability regime to broaden compensation 
obligations beyond personal injury and property damage provisions to environmental 
impairment, and has served as a model for liability rule development for the carriage 
of dangerous goods, the maritime carriage of hazardous and noxious substances, 
and revisions to civil liability provisions for nuclear damage.6 Moreover, the method 
of compensation entitlement under this regime – strict liability – has become the 
norm for pollution damage liability rules elsewhere. And it has also been rationalized 
as an effective and equitable means of incorporating the ‘polluter pays’ principle into 
the field of environmental liability.7  
 
Today, few people would disagree that environment protection is important for 
maritime transport as well as for quality shipping. However, not many share the 
same opinion with regard to the environment compensation in the oil pollution 
damage.8 Although each regime imposes liability on the shipping sector based on 
the similar principle that the polluter pays, the liability limit of a responsible party and 
the definition and scope of pollution damages, especially environmental damage, 
are the main significant differences. To such extent, any meaningful appraisal of the 
factors dictating IMO’s pollution compensation agenda must take into account the 
pervasive role of domestic environmental politics. 
 
As to the decision-making process on environmental regulations of the oil pollution 
liability regime, there are several key actors that should be considered: shipowners, 
operators, cargo owners, marine insurers, the classification societies, flag states and 
coast states9. In other words, there are two basic aspects: the maritime interests 
and the environmental interests. Moreover, the international regime is based on the 
assumption that the liability should be limited. It originates from a compromise 
                                                 
6 See Sandvik, B., Suikkari, S. “Harm and reparation in international treaty regimes: an overview.”, 
in 1997,Wetterstein, P. at pp.57-71. 
7 See Gauci, G.M “Oil Pollution at Sea- Civil Liability and Compensation for Damage”, John Wiley, 
Chichester, in 1997, at p.10. 
8 See Gauci,G.M. “Protection of the marine environmental though the international ship-source oil 
pollution compensation regime”. Review of European Community & International Environmental 
Law 1999: 8(1), at pp29-36. 
9 Alan Khee-Jin Tan, supra note 5, at pp.34-74. 
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among political and economic interests such as developed shipping countries, 
environmentally conscious coastal countries, the insurance industry, and the oil 
industry.10  
 
As oil pollution from tanker is a hot topic, many experts have done a lot research on 
the technical and operational regulations as well as the accidents analysis with 
regard to the development of IMO conventions. However, there is no systematic 
analysis from the economic point of view. Meanwhile, the liability regime, which 
consists of international conventions and national legislations, has not been 
harmonized by many countries. It is necessary for the regulators to have the entire 
understanding of the cost-benefit analysis in order to achieve the optimal level of the 
pollution. 
 
So far, Ma emphasized that the maritime environment is an economic issue.11 
Besides that, Alan analyzed the law and politics of international regulation on the 
vessel-source marine pollution.12 Xu put forward a theoretical framework of 
economic analysis of law governing marine pollution.13 Therefore, the problem is 
how to describe the economic issues on the oil pollution liability regime. In addition, 
whether the international regulations are the proper solution to all countries? What 
are the appropriate types and levels of such regulations and how can they be 
determined? There are the key questions that the economics of maritime 
environment regulations on oil liability regime should address and answer. 
 
1.2 Literature Review 
 
There are mainly four types of literatures that relate directly to this research. The 
first one is a statistic literature dealing with the crude oil trade and tanker accidents. 
                                                 
10 See Michael Mason., “Transitional Compensation for oil pollution damage: Examining changing 
Spatialities of Environmental Liability.”, in Marine Policy (2003), at p.2. 
11 See Ma, S., “Economics of Maritime Safety and Environmental Regulations”. In: Grammenos, 
C.Th.(ed.): The Handbook of Maritime Economics and Business. London: LLP, 2002, p.400. 
12 supra footnote 5, at pp.1-10 
13 See Jingjing, Xu., “Theoretical Framework of Economic Analysis of Law Governing Marine 
Pollution”. In WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs, 2006, pp.75-94. 
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Furthermore, the second one is a legal literature with regard to the development of 
the oil compensation regime. In addition, the third one is an economic literature 
dealing with the harmonization of environmental economics and marine regulations. 
Finally, the last one is a policy literature dealing with the different options on the oil 
liability of the world. 
 
1.2.1 Statistic Literature 
 
These statistic data aim to describe the world crude oil trade and tanker accidents 
as well as the oil spill tonnage during the last decades. Meanwhile, the ‘Gross 
National Income’ (GNI) level is introduced to assess the relevant factors on the 
‘Willingness to Accept’ (WTA) on the optimal level of pollution. These include 
Fearnleys review, ITOPF, World Bank, Mikelis,N. and Papanikolaou,A. etc. 
 
‘Fearnleys’ World Bulk Trades was first issued in 1961 and has since become a 
world leader on the subject of international seaborne trade in crude oil and dry bulk 
commodities. In Fearnleys’ review 2003 and 2004, crude oil historical trade 
developments are retrieved to illustrate the crude oil shipping industry. The detailed 
trade numbers cover the period from 1992 to 2004.14  
 
The International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Limited (ITOPF), which 
funded by the vast majority of the world’s shipowners, is a non-profit making 
organization responding to oil spills. The number and quantity of oil spills from 
year1970 to 2004 are collected to show the tanker accidents with regard to the 
development of the relevant instruments.15
 
In the research of Papanikolaou A, Eliopoulou E, Mikelis N on the casualty analysis 
of tankers, a three-year period project entitled ‘POP&C’ provided by the European 
Commission, concludes that the quantity of spill is relatively stable even though the 
                                                 
14 See Fearnleys’ annual review 2003 and 2004. in Oslo. Fearnelys annual report is the statistic of the 
world buck trades, which is available at WMU library. 
15  See oil spill statistic, at http://www.itopf.org. 
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accident rates declined in terms of the investigation of the specified ‘AFRAMAX’ 
tankers.16
 
The World Bank publishes the countries’ GNI, which is the standard for the division 
of level of national incomes.17 Meanwhile, the IOPC Fund supplies the contribution 
of parties among Fund convention.18
1.2.2 Legal Literature 
 
These researches cover the framework of marine pollution conventions from 
international public law to private law. In particular, the international oil pollution 
liability law (CLC and Fund) are detailed analyzed by many experts, such as 
Mukherjee, Gauci, Mason etc. Meanwhile, the IOPC Fund describes the claim 
manual as well as the guide to the international conventions on liability and 
compensation for oil pollution damage.  
 
Mukherjee analyzed the law of marine pollution from the broad regimes, which cover 
the public, regulatory and private laws, and pointed the genuine links among these 
areas.19
 
Gauci studied the liability and compensation for damage among the oil pollution at 
sea, which demonstrated in detail the terms and legal judgement with regard to the 
relevant international conventions.20
 
IOPC Fund published the claim manual to guide the damage claims among the 
arena of FUND 92 and lists the scope of pollution damage, which gave a various 
interpretation on the environmental damage.21
                                                 
16 See Dr Nikos Mikelis, “Tanker safety record at all-time high”, in IMO NEWS 2005(4), at pp.14-16.  
17 See World Bank, “World Development Report 2004-Making Services Work for Poor People”, at 
Oxford University Press, at http://www.worldbank.org/data/.
18  See IOPC Fund Annual Report, at http://www.iopcfund.org. 
19 Dr. Proshanto K. Mukherjee. “Maritime Legislation”, Malmö: World Maritime University 
Publishing in 2002, at pp.203-208. In addition, the Law of Marine Pollution lectures at the World 
Maritime University in 2006.  
20 supra footnote 7 
21 supra footnote 18. 
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1.2.3 Economic Literature  
The literatures include the principle of environmental economics and methodology of 
economics of maritime safety and environment economic as well as the theoretical 
framework of economic analysis of law governing marine pollution.  
 
Hussein systematically studied the basic principles of environmental economics and 
puts forward the first principle of natural environment.22 Meanwhile, John Asafu-
Adjaye introduced some tools for environmental policy analysis.23 Above all, Ma 
introduced the economical principle to the field of maritime safety and environment 
protection. The optimal pollution level and country’s WTA are coincided in case of 
effective environmental regulations.24  
 
Coase examined the problem of social cost by following the economics of welfare.25 
Furthermore, Xu studied the theoretical framework of economic analysis of law 
governing marine pollution based on the theory-economics of law.26  
1.2.4 Policy Literature  
As for the policy options, there are a number of researches to exam the national 
strategy or assess the current policy, in particular, in US, Japan and China etc. 
 
Kim gave a comparison analysis between the internal and US regimes regulating oil 
pollution liability and compensation, which pointed the major different liability options 
and scope of pollution damage such as the area of environmental damage.27
 
Luo and Lu conducted the crude oil transportation research in China and suggested 
that the oil compensation regime should be developed.28
                                                 
22 Hussein, M.A,. “Principles of Environmental Economics”. In: London, 2004. 
23 John Asafu-Adjaye. “Environmental Economics for Non-Economists.” World Scientific Publishing 
Co.Pte.Ltd, in London, 2000. 
24 See supra footnote 11, at pp. 415-418 
25 See Coase,R.H. “The problem of Social Cost”, from Journal of Law and Economics, in 1960. 
26 See supra footnote 13, at p.92. 
27 See Inho Kim, “A comarison between the international and US regimes regulating oil pollution 
liability and compensation”, Marine Polciy, 2003 (27),at pp.265-279. 
28 See Hua, Lu.“China’s Strategic Oil Reserves and the Establishment of the Oil Spill Contingency 
System”. Maritime Economics & Logistics, 2004(6), at pp.349-359 
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1.3 Objectives 
 
This dissertation attempts to carry out a study of the economics of maritime 
regulations on oil pollution liability regime and seeks to compare the different liability 
options among selected countries. The main objective of this research is to analyse 
the relationship between the economic system and the maritime environment 
system and additionally, the regulation framework that determines the choice of oil 
pollution compensation regime in different countries. Especially, the paper is 
focused on the interaction between tanker shipping industry and maritime 
environment policy by using the principal economic concepts such as demand and 
supply, elasticity and monopoly or competitive tanker market etc. Enumerated below 
are a few broadly defined objectives of the study: 
? To study the condition of world oil trade and oil spill accidents as well as the 
development of international conventions on oil pollution in the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO). 
? To trace the history of maritime environmental regulations on oil liability 
regime and analyze the special features of property right and externalities of 
environmental damage.  
? To bring out the principle of economics of environment and illustrate the 
theoretical model on the oil pollution liability regime. 
? To compare the different liability choices among US, Japan and China, who 
are the three biggest oil imports in the world and find the major contributions 
to the determination of oil liability policy.  
1.4 Methodology and Limitation 
 
The design of this research is primarily based on data collection, documentary 
review and comparative analysis. 
 
Considerable emphasis has been placed on data digging by collection various data 
from crude oil shipping, oil spill accidents and gross national income etc. Most of 
these materials come from official report or review and some of them are obtained 
from journals and other academic researches. 
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The documentary review follows a chronological process of the various instruments 
are provided, detailing how the interest politics of the relevant state have come to 
influence the regime formation process and its effectiveness in dealing with the oil 
pollution liability in tanker shipping. 
 
The scope of economics of maritime regulations on the oil pollution liability regime is 
a broad topic. However, this dissertation restricts its focus on the liability regime. 
Meanwhile, the oil here refers mainly to the crude oil carried by tanker. Finally, only 
the typical countries, such as US, Japan, China, are selected to analyze the policy 
options. 
1.5 Structures of the Dissertation 
 
The research is presented in six chapters. Chapter 1 presents the background and 
objectives of this research based on the literature review. In chapter 2, crude oil 
seaborne trade is analyzed with the development of tanker fleet as well as the oil 
spill accidents. It presents a whole understanding of the background of international 
conventions. In chapter 3, the international conventions are detailed discussed. 
Chapter 4 demonstrate how economic principles are supposed to work under 
maritime environmental law. In addition, the theoretical framework of economic 
analysis on regulation options is addressed. In Chapter 5, the case study brings out 
a clear comparative liability options among US, Japan and China. Finally, chapter 6 
concludes with an assessment of economic methods on maritime environmental 
regulations on the oil pollution liability and their policy implications as well as some 
limitation of this research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
2 Crude Oil Seaborne Trade and Oil Spills 
 
The principal purpose of most oil liability regime is related to the oil spills of tankers, 
so it is essential to have a basic understanding of crude oil seaborne trade, tanker 
fleet, and, in particular, overall tanker accidents and oil spills. Tanker accidents and 
marine environmental conventions are interrelated, each at times typical accidents 
influencing the characteristics of the IMO conventions. In this research, we only 
concentrate on the crude oil seaborne trade.29
 
This chapter first presents the features of crude oil seaborne trade, followed by 
some brief historical data of trade as well as the development of the tanker fleet. 
Moreover, the historical oil spills are described with the cause-consequence analysis 
in terms of selected tanker type. Lastly, a brief list of the relevant IMO conventions 
are given, which influenced the tanker safety in the last decades. 
2.1 Crude Oil Seaborne Trade 
 
2.1.1 Crude Oil Transport 
The crude oil seaborne trade plays a very important role in the world seaborne 
trade.30 According to the statistics of Fearnleys, in 1992, the world seaborne trade 
was of 4,221 million tons, among which 1,313m tons were crude oil. The volume 
increased in 2002 to 5,820m tons and the volume of crude oil was 1,588m tons. In 
2003, of this total 6,133m tons world seaborne trade, about 27% or 1,673 million 
                                                 
29 This restrictive definition of ‘persistent oil’ here only refers to crude oil because of the information 
limited by this research. In essence, ‘oil’ shall confined to any persistent oil such as crude oil, fuel oil, 
lubricating oil and whale oil under the scope of CLC/Fund conventions. 
30 See Shuo, M. , “Demand of Maritime Transport” in Maritime Economics (2005), unpublished 
course lectures at the World Maritime University, Malmö, Sweden, at p.15. 
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tons were crude oil and another 440 million tons of oil products were transport by 
tankers.31 The majority of tanker cargo is oil, which includes crude oil (80%) and oil 
products (20%). 32
 
The Figure 1 shows the development of the crude oil seaborne trade from 1992 to 
2004 all over the world. Thus, we could conclude that the world crude oil seaborne 
trade maintain a big amount and increased slowly, for instance, there is a slight 
decrease during the period from year 2000 to 2002. 
 
Figure 1: Crude Oil Seaborne Trades 1992-2004 
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(Source: Compiled from Fearnleys Review 2004 and 2005) 
 
Generally, the transport of crude oil follows the same pattern of the industrial 
production and economic activities measured by GDP.33The major reason that 
crude oil has been the biggest single commodity in maritime transport is not only 
that it is a principle source of energy, it is also because, world oil production and 
consumption are by and large concentrated in different parts of the world, relatively 
                                                 
31 supra footnote 14, at pp.6-8 
32 supra footnote 30, at p.15 
33 supra footnote 30, at p.22. 
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far away from each other and separated by oceans. As a principle source of energy 
for industrial activities and daily consumption, oil is consumed to a large extent in 
the most industrialized parts of the world with high income per capital. For instance, 
in 2003, above 67 per cent of oil was consumed by the OECD countries, which 
contribute over 70% of world GDP.34  
 
The main ocean shipping lines of crude oil are those from the Middle East to 
Northeast Europe, the Mediterranean Sea, North America, Japan and other Asian 
regions; from North Africa to the Mediterranean Sea; from West African to North 
America; and from Caribbean region to North America. The countries and regions 
with crude oil exports exceeding 100 million tons are the Middle East, North Africa, 
West Africa, Egypt, Venezuela and Mexico. The countries and region with crude oil 
imports exceeding 100 million tons are the United States, Western Europe, Japan 
and South Korea, China. The crude oil transportation lines situation in 2003 is 
outlined in Appendix A. Furthermore, the following Figure 2 highlights the major oil 
trade movement of the world in 2005. 
 
Figure 2: World Major Oil Trade Movement in 2005 
 
(Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2005) 
 
                                                 
34 supra footnote 30, at p. 23. 
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As oil trade always flows to economic production centres and there are new centres 
emerging in the developing world, the oil trade pattern described above will certainly 
be changing accordingly.35  
 
According to the BP energy analysis, in future 15 years, the world petroleum supply 
and demand will keep the trend of stable growth. The world marine crude oil 
transportation volume is expected to continue to grow by an annual increase of 
2.0% and will reach approximate 1.9 billion tons in 2010 and approximate 2.1 billion 
tons in 2015.36 Table 1 shows the oil imports and exports situation of the three 
biggest economic entities in the world. These selected countries are the biggest 
economic states of the world, too.  
 
Table 1: Oil Imports and Exports in 2005(Million tonnes) 
 
Countries Crude 
imports 
Product 
imports 
Crude 
Exports 
Product 
Exports 
US 500,7 166,0 1,9 52,2 
Japan 210,4 47,8 - 5,1 
China 127,1 39,8 6,7 14,0 
Total World 1885,2 576,3 1885,2 576,3 
 
(Source: retrieve from “BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2006”) 
 
From the above table, it indicates that US imported about 500 million crude oil in 
2005, which is bigger than the total of Japanese and Chinese imported crude oil. In 
addition, Japan relies entirely on crude oil imports as it doesn’t export any crude oil. 
As for these three countries, they are the biggest crude oil importers of the world. 
 
                                                 
35 supra footnote 30, at p.24. 
36 See BP energy analysis, in BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2006, at 
http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview.  
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2.1.2 Tanker Fleet 
Oil tanker fleet is the largest type fleet of the world, accounting for about 40% of the 
total tonnage of world commercial fleet. Tankers carry their cargo in a number of 
tanks or compartments within the hull of the ship. According to the size of the tanker, 
there are four classes of tankers: Aframax, Suezmax, VLCC and ULCC.  
 
The demand of tanker fleet depends mainly on the oil transport market. As 
described above, the oil seaborne trade increased steady during recent decades, 
the capacity of tanker fleet increased accordingly. The situation is proved by the 
historical data of the Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Development of World Tanker Fleet and Trade 1992-2004 
 
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Fleet1 225 227 231 223 227 229 232 237 236 244 235 245 258 
Trade2 5.8 6.4 6.6 6.9 7.1 7.7 7.4 7.3 7.6 7.6 7.7 6.8 7.0 
Note: 1.Million dwt at mid-year, Vessels over 50,000 dwt. 
          2.Cargo tonnes per dwt. 
(Source: retrieved from Fearnleys Review 2005) 
 
In the above Table 2, the world tanker fleet have been compiled and calculated 
additional figures like cargo tonnes per dwt in order to give the reader a better view 
of the developments during the last twelve-year period, particularly as to the 
efficiency of the fleet. The concept ‘cargo tonnes per dwt’ is not the true measure of 
efficiency, but this statistical result is an indicator of vessels’ employment. 
 
In the previous section, it mentioned that about 1,673m tons crude oil in 2003 was 
moved by sea. But this figure is not reflecting the exact size of the world oil 
seaborne trade needs. By knowing only the volume of oil seaborne trade, one 
cannot tell how many tankers are required for the transport because of the oil 
seaborne geography.37 In a maritime transport sector such as tanker shipping, the 
distance that crude oil has to travel must be taken into consideration.  
                                                 
37 supra footnote 30, at p.31. 
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 Table 3: World Seaborne Trade on Crude Oil by Tankers 1992-2004 
 
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Million 
tonnes 
1313 1356 1403 1415 1466 1519 1535 1550 1608 1592 1588 1673 1800 
Billion 
tonne-
miles 
6977 7251 7330 7224 7495 7830 7889 7980 8180 8074 7848 8390 8910 
 
(Source: Compiled from Fearnleys Review 2003 & 2004,) 
 
The Table 3 shows the situation of the billion tonne-miles as well as the crude oil 
million tonnes by tankers during the period from 1992 to 2004. Essentially, the 
distance is important to maritime transport and thereby the tonne-miles make more 
sense for tanker fleet. 
 
2.1.3 Tanker Fleets of Selected Countries 
According to ISL, by early 2003 the world national and regional oil tanker fleets were 
ranked as follows: Greek oil tanker fleet as number one with 64.4 million dwt; that of 
Japan was number two with 37.1 million dwt; that of US was number four with 29.1 
million dwt; that of South Korea was number eight with 8.3 million dwt; and the fleet 
from Chinese mainland was ranked number twelve with 6.38 million dwt.38 As of 
July 1, 2004, Table 4 indicates the biggest twelve tanker fleets by country of owner. 
 
                                                 
38 See ISL, which is an Institute of shipping economics and logistics in Europe.“Shipping Statistics 
Year Book in 2004”, the world fleet, shipbuilding and ports, etc. online available at 
http://www.isl.org/prodcuts_services/publications/ssmr.shtml.en  
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 Table 4: Tanker Fleet by Country of Owner of Selected Countries 
 
                                                                                           (Tonnage in Thousands) 
No. Countries Number DWT No. Countries Number DWT 
1 Greece 857 71,079 7 Saudi Arabia 78 11,584 
2 Japan 797 40,469 8 Germany 249 10,295 
3 United States 371 28,390 9 China 327 9,216 
4 Norway 393 25,658 10 Russia 422 9,083 
5 Hongkong 154 14,505 11 United Kingdom 173 8,566 
6 Singapore 324 14,487 12 India 125 8,335 
 
(Source: ISL Shipping Statistics Year Book in 2004) 
 
From the above Table 4, the average tanker size of US is bigger than in China by 
comparing the dwt at a similar amount of tanker numbers. In US, there is a sum of 
28,390 thousands of dwt with 371 tankers. However, there are a total of 9,216 
thousands of dwt with 327 tankers. This indicates the tanker size become bigger 
and bigger in recent market. 
 
In order to reduce the operational cost and minimize risks, more and more ships 
would register with flags of convenience or flags of certain foreign countries. 
According to ISL statistics, up to 2003, 63.1% of the world commercial fleet tonnage 
was registered with flags of foreign countries, increased by 1.3% over that of 2000. 
Furthermore, among this, 62.4% of the world oil tanker fleet tonnage was registered 
with foreign flags, increased by 0.2% over that of 2000. 
 
In terms of countries, Saudi Arabia had the largest proportion of 94.2% foreign flags 
in oil tanker fleets; Japanese oil tanker fleets had the second largest proportion of 
81% foreign flags; the proportion of that of South Korean is 78.1%; and Chinese 
mainland had the smallest proportion of 38.1%.39
                                                 
39 supra footnote 37. As for the countries, see supra footnote 5, at pp66-67. It analyze that Japan’s role 
in world shipping is significant in view of the size of its economy and the strength of its industrial 
production. Due to its lack of natural resources, Japan relies heavily on the imported in large volumes.  
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2.2 Oil Spills 
 
2.2.1 Oil Spill Statistics 
The majority oil spills come from the tanker accidents. According to ITOPF’s 
worldwide oil spill statistics, accidents involving spillage of over 50 tonnes of oil took 
place in 112 countries during the past 40 years.40  
 
Figure 3: Numbers of Oil Spills over 700 Tonnes 
 
 
The 1969 CLC 
OPA 90
The 1971 Fund 
The 1992 CLC
The 1992 Fund
The 2003 
Supplementary Fund 
(Source: retrieve from ITOPF at http://www.itopf.com/data ) 
 
Figure 3 shows a dramatic reduction in the number of oil spills from tankers. For 
instance, from year 2000 to 2005, the average number of spills per year is about 3.7 
in contrast with 9.3 spills per year on average during 1980 to 1989. However, there 
were about 25.2 spills per year on average during the first ten statistic years: 1970-
1979. Therefore, the number of oil spill from tanker accidents has decreased a lot. 
 
Furthermore, it is notable that a few very large spills are responsible for a high 
percentage of the oil spilt. For example, in the ten-year period 1990-1999 there were 
                                                 
40 ITOPF is a source of comprehensive information on marine oil pollution through its library, wide 
range of technical publications, videos and website, at http://www.itopf.com/statistics . 
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358 spills over 7 tonnes, totally 1,140,000 tonnes, but 830,000 tonnes (73%) were 
spilt in just 10 incidents (just under 3% of the total number of accidents).  
 
Moreover, the figures for a particular year may therefore be severely distorted by a 
single large incident. This is clearly illustrated by 1979 (“Atlantic Empress” – 287,000 
tonnes), 1983 (“Castillo de Bellver” – 252,000 tonnes) and 1991 (“ABT Summer” – 
260,000 tonnes). Since 1967, the biggest size of oil spills was Atlantic Empress, 
which happened in 1979 off Tobago in West Indies, caused about 287,000 tonnes 
oil spill.41 The amount of oil spill per year is illustrated in the following Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: Quantities of Oil Spill from 1970 to 2004 
 
 
 
(Source: retrieve from the ITOPF at http://www.itopf.com/stats.html) 
 
From the above graph, we could also conclude that the majority of oil spill came 
from the big tanker accidents in a particular year. Such as in 1999, the sinking of the 
oil tanker Erika off the French coast in December spilt about 20,000 tonnes crude oil 
in all. Most of these disasters require an entire investigation of the cause and 
consequence as well as the further influence on the regulation of tanker safety. 
 
                                                 
41 supra footnote 37. 
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2.2.2 Casualty Analysis of Tankers 
 
Most incidents are the result of a combination of actions and circumstance, all of 
which contribute in varying degrees to the final outcome.42 Basically, there causes 
can be grouped into “operations” and “accidents”. Generally, most spills from 
tankers result from routine operations such as loading, discharging and bunkering 
which normally occur in ports or at oil terminals – perhaps as many as 92% of oil 
spills.43However, the majority quantities of these operational oil spills are small, with 
some 91% involving quantities of less than 7 tonnes. The accidental causes such as 
collisions, groundings and non-accidental structural failures generally give rise to 
much larger spills, with at least 84% of incidents involving quantities in excess of 
700 tonnes being attributed to such factors.44
 
The European Commission provided funding for a 3-year project entitled “Pollution 
Prevention and Control – Safe Transportation of Hazardous Goods by Tankers” 
(POP&C), which starting in 2004 aims to develop a framework and first-principles 
tools for a methodological assessment of risk.45 The project selected the AFRAMAX 
class of tankers to do the data analysis. The selection of the particular tanker ship 
size was based on DWT size segment 80,000 – 119,999.  
 
Therefore, in the following section, all the analysis and conclusions are limited to the 
selected class of tankers: AFRAMAX. 
 
2.2.3 AFRAMAX Case 
 
The Aframax class of tanker is the most populous class of internationally trading 
large oil tankers. As for the relatively large market segment of the AFRAMAX 
tankers, past spectacular catastrophic tanker accidents involving AFRAMAX tankers 
and relatively high number of single hull AFRAMAX tanker, which are currently 
                                                 
42 See Dr. Jens-Uwe Schroeder, “Casualty Investigation”, unpublished handout at the World Maritime 
University, Malmö, Sweden.  
43 supra footnote 1. 
44 supra footnote 37. 
45 supra footnote 16, at p.14. 
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operational and expected to continue operating until they reach the recently 
amended (accelerated) phase-out date.46 Since the POP&C project has used the 
AFRAPMAX size tankes to demonstrate the applicability of the developed risk based 
methodology, the analysis of past incidents was also focused on records pertaining 
to AFRAMAX tankers.  
 
2.2.3.1 Data Collection 
 
The historic data from the period 1978 to early 2004 was derived from Lloyd’s 
Marine Information Service and from Lloyds’ Register-Fairplay. Out of all the 
available records, 1294 incident records were finally extracted. Six casualty 
categories were identified as the key hazards leading to loss of watertight integrity, 
namely: collision, contact, grounding, non-accidental structural failure, fire and 
explosion. The oil spill comes out if the ship’s watertight integrity were lost. 
Operational pollution and pollution resulting from failures of hull fittings were left 
outside the scope of the project. The whole data and methodology were illustrated in 
the research of POP&C project.47 In this section, only the oil spill accidents are 
retrieved to emphasize the scope of the research. 
 
2.2.3.2 Accident Rates per year 
 
Taking into account the accidents that led to serious and catastrophic (total loss) 
consequences (S-TL), the frequencies exhibit similar downward trends for all the 
accident categories investigated. In Table 5, the average values of rates are 
presented for pre and post-90 periods. 
                                                 
46 See IMO news in 2003, “Accelerate to phase-out the single hull tanker”, at http://www.imo.org . 
47 See Papanikolaou A, “Systematic Analysis and Review of AFRAMAX Tankers incidents”, in the 11th 
International Association of the Mediterranean Congress IMAM, 2005. For the analysis of the 
relationship between the Incident Rates and Earnings, it concludes a trend of overall improvements in 
both earnings and safety. This is consistent with the generally held understanding that higher markets 
lead to higher incident rates. See supra footnote 16, at p.16.  
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Table 5: Accident Rates per year 
 
Period Accidents Rates Rates of accidents with serious and 
catastrophic consequences 
1978-1990 1.15E-01(1) 2.37E-02 
1991-2003 3.81E-02 7.28E-03 
   Note: (1) E is an index number, which means 1.15*10-1
 
(Source: Papanikolaou A, 2006) 
 
The Table 5 shows that in the post-90 period, not only the number of accidents was 
reduced but also the number of accidents with serious and catastrophic (total loss) 
consequences were reduced to almost the same extent. The reason of the 
significant improvement in the safety record of the AFRAMAX tankers may be 
considered to be the result of stricter international regulations enacted in the early 
1990s and advances made in design and safe operation of tankers. A series of IMO 
conventions concerning the prevention of incidents and accidents have apparently 
contributed to this improvement.48
 
2.2.3.3 Spilled Tonne Rates per year 
 
Taking into account accidents that caused environmental pollution, independently 
from the quantity of oil spilt, it is evident that the rate of accidents leading to pollution 
also decline during the studied period, but not to the same extent as in the case of 
all accidents.49
 
When the oil spill quantity is taken into consideration in calculating the rates per ship 
year, the result is somewhat different as described in the following Table 6. 
 
 
                                                 
48 See supra footnote 16, at p.15.  
49 See Papanikolaou A., Mikelis N.,“Critical Review of AFRAMAX Tankers Incidents”, 3rd 
International Conference ENSUS, in 2005. 
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Table 6: Average Rates of Accidents & Spilled Tonne Rates 
 
Period Rates of accidents with oil pollution Spilled Tonne Rate per ship year
1978-2003 5.54E-03 32.5 
1978-1990 6.74E-03 29.6 
1991-2003 4.35E-03 35.4 
 
(Source: Papanikolaou A, 2006) 
 
From the Table 6, although the frequency of accidents has been substantially 
reduced in the post-90 period, there is no reduction in spilled tonne rates in the 
same period, but even an increase.  
 
The reason was that some particular casualty per year would cause serious 
environmental damage. For instance, during the high spilled tonne rates were 
experienced in the following three years: 1980, 1993 and 2002, this is not related to 
a high frequency of accidents resulting to pollution, but to one individual casualty per 
mentioned year with serious environmental consequences, namely “IRENES 
SERENADE” (80,000t spilled, 1980), “BRAER” (88,214t spilled, 1993) and 
“PRESTIGE” (77,000 t spilled, 2002), which are also proved by the Figure 4.  
2.2.3.4 Investigation Results 
 
Therefore, the risk consequence to the environment has been slightly increased 
even though the frequency of accidents has been significantly reduced. This 
situation can also be proved by the following Figure 5. 
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Figure 5: Comparison of Rate's Reduction 
 
AFRAMAX Comparision of rates per shipyear
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(Source: compiled from the POP&C project ) 
 
In conclusion, for AFRAMAX tankers, the accident rate per shipyear has reduced 
significantly when considering pre and post 1990 accidents. However, the rate of 
accidents leading to pollution per shipyear has reduced by a less significant amount. 
There is something that should be emphasized that the AFRAMAX tankers are only 
a part of all the tankers. The statistic analysis aims to discover the trend of accident 
rate and accident rate leading to pollution. The potential founding in this research is 
that the quantity of oil spilled accident mainly relies on the individual tanker casualty.  
 
2.3 Tanker Accident Impact on the Conventions 
 
Although the tanker appears by statistics to be safer than before, marine incidents 
always happened and oil spill will continue to. The prime concern of tanker casualty 
statistic is not to totally eliminate the incidents/accidents, because the probability of 
occurrence always exists, but to minimise the probability of occurrence and to 
mitigate the serious consequences of an incident/accident.50 Investigations into 
some tragic tanker and other ship accidents have provided an in-depth knowledge 
                                                 
50 See supra footnote 39. 
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and experience to change the tanker safety regime in the past years. Significant 
outcomes of some catastrophic casualties that were investigated, led to 
improvements of IMO’s regulatory framework and eventually of marine safety and 
operation. 
 
As far as the Tanker Fleet is concerned, some serious casualties led to the adoption 
of new regulations or amendments of the existing ones.51 Some spectacular tanker 
casualties are stated below: 
? The grounding of “Torrey Canyon”, in 1967, led to the biggest marine 
pollution in history at that time. The result of this investigation contributed to 
MARPOL 1973, STCW 1978 and SOLAS 1974 (fire safety provisions for 
tankers). 
? The grounding of “Argo Merchant”, in 1976, contributed to the development 
of Protocol 1978 of MARPOL. 
? The grounding of “Amoco Cadiz”, in 1978, led to the implementation of 
MARPOL 1978 Protocol. 
? The “Exxon Valdez” casualty, in 1989, led to the adoption of the first regional 
agreement (application in US waters), OPA 90. 
? The “Erika” disaster, in 1999, contributed to the revision of MARPOL 73/78 
(Reg. 13G) which regulated a new phase-out for single hull tankers (MEPC-
IMO). Furthermore, this particular accident led the European Union to the 
adoption of the ERIKA I and ERIKA II EU Marine Resolutions. 
? Following the “Prestige” accident in 2002, the European Union adopted 
Regulation 1726/2003 (accelerated single hull tanker phase-out, carriage of 
heavy grade oils in double hull tankers, enhanced hull condition assessment). 
This regulation took effect within EU on 21 October 2003. The IMO’s Marine 
Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) adopted amendments to 
Regulation 13G and produced Regulation 13H to Annex I of MARPOL on 4 
December 2003. 
 
                                                 
51 See Dr. P.K.Mukherjee, “Law of Marine Pollution” lectures (2006) at the World Maritime 
University, Malmö, Sweden.  
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As examined above, multilateral standard-setting on the tanker pollution regulations 
is conducted primarily within the IMO arena where the interests of the relevant 
actors are advanced and reconciled. Alan offers a comprehensive and convincing 
account of how ships may be better regulated and reduced by analysing the 
regulation of vessel-source pollution from the perspective of the political interests of 
key players in the ship transportation industry.52
 
2.4 Chapter Summary 
 
Presently, crude oil seaborne trade remains as a key factor in the world seaborne 
trade with the development of world economics. As forecasted in future 15 years, 
the world crude oil supply and demand will keep the trend of stable growth. This 
explains why the need to maintain vigilance in oil pollution. Overall, the fact that 
increasing regulation has led to declining levels of tanker casualties. However, in 
terms of AFRAMAX tankers in last decades, the accidents rates has declined in 
contrast that the accidents lead to oil spill is relatively stable.  
 
Above all, the potential tanker accidents will exist once the oil seaborne trade 
continues. The tanker safety is still a key issue among the shipping industry. 
Ultimately, the stakeholders in the oil seaborne trade should be made to assume a 
larger share of environmental liability and responsibility. In this regard, the following 
chapter will consider the civil liability and compensation on oil pollution damage. 
                                                 
52 supra footnote 5, at pp.10-17 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 
3 Maritime Environment Regulations on Oil Pollution Damage 
 
The legal framework of maritime environment is of primary importance in the oil 
compensation regime, and the relevant IMO conventions are most commonly 
applied in this area.  
 
This chapter begins with a review of general legal framework of marine environment 
from public international law to private law, in particular, the development of the civil 
liability and compensation regime under CLC/FUND conventions. In following 
sections, a guide to the international conventions on liability and compensation for 
oil pollution damage is briefly reviewed, and specific features like ‘pollution damage’, 
‘claims for environmental damage’ and ‘property rights’ are discussed.  
 
3.1 The Legal Regimes Addressing Marine Pollution 
 
The subject of marine pollution is of prime importance in today’s maritime world, in 
particular, to the quality shipping and environment friendship. Marine pollution 
concerns arose only after oil was discovered in the early part of this century, and oil 
tankers entered the arena of shipping and ocean transportation. The problems 
relating to pollution of the seas are on-going and the law appears to be continuously 
developing to cope with the consequences. At present, there is a whole body of law 
on the subject of tanker oil pollution governed largely by international conventions. 
The law stretches across a spectrum from public international law to international 
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private law. 53  Until recently, there were also international voluntary schemes which 
were contractual in nature.54
3.1.1 Public International Law Regime 
 
The public international law framework for the regime of vessel source pollution is 
contained in Article 211 of UNCLOS, which requires flag states to adopt laws for the 
prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution applicable to their ships.55 
Moreover, UNCLOS provides a broad jurisdictional framework within which the 
regulation can be located. In essence, the laws must be consistent with generally 
accepted international rules and standards established through the relevant 
competent international organization or general diplomatic conference, such as IMO.  
 
As far as IMO conventions are concerned, marine pollution related regulations can 
be divided into three categories: regulations of pollution prevention, regulations of 
response and reaction and regulations of liability and compensation.56  
 
Firstly, regulations of pollution prevention include conventions of MARPOL 73/78, 
Dumping, Intervention, Anti-fouling (AFS) and Ballast water management (BWM). 
These sets are designed to prevent pollution of the marine environment. Prime 
among these is the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships. For instance, MARPOL 73/78 Convention, which has six annexes, deals with 
oil pollution, pollution by chemicals carried in bulk, harmful substances in packaged 
form, sewage, garbage and air pollution. Others include Conventions on the 
dumping of wastes at sea, on the rights of coastal states to intervene if their 
                                                 
53 supra footnote 18, at p.203. See the Law of Marine Pollution lectures at the World Maritime 
University. Besides the international conventions, there are also penal laws as well as civil liability 
regimes, both statutory and otherwise in domestic spheres, which fall outside the scope of 
international conventions. For instance, the Oil Pollution Act 1990 of the United States is a domestic 
statutory liability and compensation which has international implications.  
54 supra footnote 18. Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement Concerning Liability for Oil Pollution 
(TOVALOP) and Contract Regarding a Supplement to Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution (CRISTAL). 
These schemes has now been terminated.  
55 See Article 211, “Pollution from vessels”, in UNCLOS. 
56 supra footnote 18, at p.204-205. In addition, Dr. P.K. Mukherjee also brings forward a principle to 
divide the Marine Pollution Conventions in to three areas: Public, Regulatory and Private, which are 
closely interfaced. See Law of Marine Pollution Handouts (2006) at the World Maritime University, 
Malmö, Sweden. 
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coastline is under threat of pollution following upon a maritime casualty, on the use 
of certain toxic substances in ships’ anti-fouling paint and on ballast water 
management.  
 
Secondly, the regulations of response and reaction cover SAR, OPRC with HNS 
protocol. In these series of Conventions have been developed that are designed to 
ensure a proper response to minimise the negative repercussions when accidents 
do happen. The most important consideration is the protection of human life, and to 
this end the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (the SAR 
Convention) enshrines an international SAR plan to ensure that, no matter where an 
accident occurs, rescue operations will be co-ordinated by a proper search and 
rescue organization and, when necessary, by co-operation between neighbouring 
SAR organizations. Moreover, other measures in this category include the OPRC 
Convention which establishes measures for dealing with pollution incidents, either 
nationally or in co-operation with other countries, and its related protocol dealing 
with hazardous and noxious substances.  
 
Lastly, to deal with the aftermath of casualties, IMO has developed a series of 
Conventions to cover questions of liability and establish compensation regimes for 
victims of pollution incidents and accidents. These include CLC, FUND, the Bunker 
Convention and the HNS Convention.57
 
All these Conventions are kept up to date, with limits of liability increased where 
appropriate to match changing demands and expectations. However, in terms of 
existing international law, the central deficiency relates to the means of financial 
accountability – liability – for environmental harm across national boundaries and to 
the global commons.58  
                                                 
57 International Conventions on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969 as amended by the 
Protocol of 1976; International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Oil 
Pollution Damage, 1971. The 1984 Protocols to both these Conventions failed to go into force. New 
Protocols to the CLC and Fund Conventions have since been adopted in 1992 to revise the limitation 
regimes. Supplementary Fund Protocol, 2003. 
58 See Sandvik B, Suikkari S. “Harm and reparation in international treaty regimes: an overview”. In: 
Wetterstein P, editor. Harm to the environment: the right to compensation and the assessment of 
damage. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997. at p.58.  
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The following sections only concentrate on the civil liability regime for tanker oil 
pollution, which enables national victims of oil spill damage to make financial claims 
against domestic and non-domestic tanker owners and, in certain circumstances, 
the global oil cargo industry. 
3.1.2 The Development of International Liability Regime 
3.1.2.1 The Initial International Conventions 
 
Prevention of tanker oil pollution has been an international regulatory goal since 
1954, giving rise to various conventions, resolutions and codes developed under the 
auspices of IMO. It was not until 1954 that the UK arranged a conference which 
resulted in the adoption of the first international treaty to prevent oil pollution of the 
seas from ships.59 However, it was the Torrey Canyon disaster that confirmed the oil 
pollution would have to be done at an international level, namely, through IMO. The 
sinking of the tanker Torrey Canyon on 17 March of 1967 spilt 120,000 tons of crude 
oil into the sea off the south-west coast of England. It provoked the forerunner of 
IMO- the International Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) – 
to review state systems of civil liability for oil pollution damage.  
 
This initial regime consisted of the CLC 69 and FUND 71. The CLC placed the 
liability for oil pollution damage on the owner of the ship from which the polluting oil 
escaped or was discharged: The CLC generally adopted a standard of strict liability, 
though liability was limited to an amount that was approximately double the limits set 
under the 1957 International Convention Relating to the Limitation of the Liability of 
Owners of Sea-Going Ships. The intent here was to facilitate prompt, equitable 
compensation payments to victims for damage suffered in the territory, including the 
territorial sea, of any contracting state.60 To aid this, ships carry more than 2,000 
tons of persistent oil as cargo were required to maintain insurance with respect to oil 
pollution damage. Without insurance, the strict liability of shipowners would not be 
effectively enforced in cases in which the shipowners were financially unable to 
                                                 
59 supra footnote 1. 
60 See .Mason M., “Transnational environmental obligations: locating new spaces of accountability in 
a post-Westphalian global order”. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 2001, (26), at 
pp.407-429.   
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satisfy the amount of damages. Claims could be brought in any state where the oil 
pollution damage was suffered.61
 
However, the CLC was criticized by both shipowners and victims. For the 
shipowners, the CLC was considered excessive in the conservation world of 
maritime law in 1969, in that replaced fault liability with strict liability and doubled 
liability limits.62 The victims, on the other hand, feared that compensation might be 
inadequate for oil pollution damage from large tankers because the compensable 
amount would be decided by the capacity of the insurance market rather than by oil 
pollution damage or shipowner’s act.63
 
The Fund Convention was hereby created to supplement insufficient compensation 
to victims in return for limiting liability of shipowners in order to readjust their 
burden.64 Furthermore, Trew and Seward asserted that oil cargo interests should 
bear some of the economic consequences of oil pollution damage.65 As part of the 
Brussels compromise, IMO was entrusted therefore with the creation of a new 
international fund to supplement the liability coverage of CLC 69: the Fund 71 
sharing a strict liability and compensation ceiling framework, established a statutory 
system compelling oil cargo interests in contacting states to pay a levy, calculated 
on the basis of their national share of international oil receipts. In 1978, the IOPC 
Fund, built up from oil cargo owner contributions, was established to administer the 
compensation scheme under the Fund Convention. Thus, the two conventions as a 
whole came to provide a distribution of the financial burden between shipowners 
and oil cargo owners. The Fund Convention also included provisions for relieving 
shipowners of a percentage of their liability exceeded a specified amount. It should 
                                                 
61 See Abecassis D. “IMO and liability for oil pollution from ships: a retrospective”. In: Lloyd’s 
Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 1983; at pp.46-52. 
62 See Jacobsson M. “The international conventions on liability, compensation for oil pollution 
damage and the activities of the international oil pollution compensation fund”. In: Colin M. de la Rue, 
editor. Liability for damage to the marine environment. Lloyd’s of London Press, 1993. at p. 39 
63 See Rha YS. “A study on the compensation regime of oil pollution damage”. Unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, 1992, at p.68. available online at 
http://www.sciencedirect.com  
64 See Berlingieri F. “The work of the commit maritime international: past, present, and future”. 
Tulane Law Review 1983; (57), at pp.1260-4.  
65 Trew, J., Seward, R. “The Britannia Guide to Oil Pollution Legislation”. Britannia Steam Ship 
Insurance Association Ltd., London. 
 30
beard in mind that Parties to the CLC were not obliged to become parties to the 
FUND Convention. Up to 31 December 2000, the Fund 71 had approved the 
statement of pollution damage claims arising out of 96 incidents, amounting to over 
£263 million in total compensation payments.66  
3.1.2.2 The 1984 Protocols 
 
The formulation of the international liability and fund schemes hinges on 
compromises among economic and political interests to solve the deadlock on the 
basis issues of the responsible party and the nature of the liability.67 For instance, 
CLC 69 contracting states with sizable tanker interests (e.g. Greece, Korea, Liberia) 
were expressing alarm at incidences of national courts breaking shipowner rights to 
limited liability under the convention, undermining in their view both the economic 
viability of their shipping industries and the much vaunted equity of application of 
CLC 69.68  
 
After the 1978 Amoco Cadiz disaster, it was recognized that the liability limits of the 
two conventions were too low to provide adequate compensation in the event of a 
major oil spill. Continuing inflation had led to a substantial erosion of the liability 
limits, providing insufficient compensation for damages caused in a major incident. 
Two conventions increase the share of the burden on the oil cargo owner, 
decreasing that of the shipowner as a result both of inflation and of frequent oil spills 
whose damages exceeded the shipowner’s liability limit. Another favourable factor 
for change was the expansion in the capacity of the P&I Clubs’ market since the 
adoption of the two conventions. For the purpose of revising the two conventions, 
the IMO legal committee convened in 1983. The IMO committee examined liability 
limits on shipowners and revisited the issue of allocating the burden of 
compensation for oil spill damages between the shipowner and oil cargo owner. 
When applying the liability limits under the CLC and the 1984 Protocol to 
approximately 1700 oil spills covering 1970-1982, the share of total oil pollution 
                                                 
66 See IOPC Fund Annual Report 2001, at pp.37 and 150-171, online available 
http://www.iopcfund.org  
67 supra footnote 27. 
68 supra note 5, at pp.313-314. 
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costs which would have been borne by the shipowner rose from 47% to 68%.69 
Shipowners opposed altering the existing balance between the shipowner and oil 
cargo based on considerably low freights.70 From the shipowners’ perspective, the 
burden on oil cargo owners could be alleviated by reducing the share of the 
contributions each faces, if more countries would ratify the existing Fund Convention. 
The IMO amended the two conventions by passing Protocols balancing numerous 
conflicting economic and political interests. 
 
In an effort to induce the US participation, those Protocols broadened the scope of 
both geographical application and recoverable damages, and substantially raised 
the liability limits of the two conventions. However, because Japan, the largest 
contributor, and its oil industry felt that Japanese oil companies had carried a 
disproportionately large financial burden of contribution under the Fund Convention, 
Japan was reluctant to ratify the Protocol to the two conventions in the absence of 
an offer by the US to share the financial burden. Japanese oil receivers had paid 
contributions of £20 million in total while £5 million had been paid out in 
compensation for damages caused in Japanese territory for the first 12 years of the 
IOPC Fund. As a consequence, the Protocols failed to enter into force because of 
insufficient support from the countries and in particular from the US.71
3.1.2.3 The 1992 Conventions 
 
In 1992, the IMO created new protocols to the two conventions that were identical to 
the 1984 Protocols except for the entry into force requirements. The main purpose 
of the new protocols was to facilitate the fulfilment of the requirements for the entry 
into force of the 1984 Protocols. This change was intended to make the conventions 
effective without the participation of the US. Japan wanted to cap a limit of the share 
of contributions payable by a single member state because it felt that its oil industry 
had borne an excessively large share of the total contributions levied under the 
                                                 
69 See Jacobsson M. “The international conventions on liability, compensation for oil pollution 
damage and the activities of the international oil pollution compensation fund”. In: Colin M. de la 
Rue, editor. Liability for damage to the marine environment. Lloyd’s of London Press, 1993. at pp.39-
55 
70 supra footnote 57.  
71 supra footnote 7, at p.147. 
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previous IOPC Fund. Because Japan had been the largest contributing member 
state to the Fund, the Japanese proposal to cap contributions was accepted over 
the opposition of many states. They feared the possible distortion of competition 
among the companies in member states because a cap by state would confer 
advantages on Japanese companies relative to those in other states. Italy, which 
was pushing for a greater recovery in the wake of the 1991 Haven spill,72 desired a 
broader interpretation of pollution damage. The Italian proposal to expand the 
definition of pollution damage was rejected because Italy’s participation was less 
critical to the international regime, in particular taking into account the expanded 
liability under Italian proposal. The fundamental two-tier structure of the international 
regime remains untouched. The 1992 CLC seeks to provide uniform international 
rules and procedures for determining questions of liability and to provide primary 
compensation for pollution damage. On the other hand, the 1992 Fund Convention 
seeks to ensure supplementary compensation for pollution damage to the extent 
that the compensation provided under the 1992 CLC is insufficient.73
3.1.2.4 The 2003 Supplementary Fund 
 
In October 2000, in the wake of the Erika accident off France, the limits of both the 
1992 CLC and 1992 Fund Convention was increased by 50.37 per cent, in 
accordance with provisions contained in the Conventions.74 There higher limits 
came into effect in all States party to one or both Conventions on 1 November 2003. 
A further important development occurred in May 2003 when a Protocol was 
adopted at the IMO creating ‘The International Supplementary Fund for 
Compensation for oil Pollution Damage, 2003’ (‘Supplementary Fund’). This new 
‘third tier’ Fund, which is closely modelled on the 1992 Fund, is designed to address 
the concerns of those States which consider that even the enhanced 1992 CLC and 
Fund limits might still be insufficient to meet in full all valid claims arising out of a 
major tanker accident. Ratification of the 2003 Protocol is optional but is available to 
any State that is party to the 1992 Fund Convention. All definitions on ‘ship‘, ‘person’, 
                                                 
72 On April 11, 1991, the Haven, a Crypriot tanker (109,977 grt) caught fire after having discharged a 
part cargo of Iranian crude in Genoa. The two parts of the vessel sank and oil leakage. The claims 
presented by the Italian aspects amounted to approximately Lit 1,541,488 million.  
73 supra footnote 27, at 268. 
74 See IOPC Fund Annual report 2004, at http://www.iopcfund.org . 
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‘owner’, ‘oil’, ‘pollution damage’, ‘preventive measures’ and ‘incident’ have the same 
meaning as in article I of the 1992 CLC and Article I of the 1992 FUND.75 This 
implies that the 2003 Protocol does not change the meaning of the notion ‘pollution 
damage’, so that compensation for environmental damage is to be restricted to the 
costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement actually undertaken or to be 
undertaken.76
3.1.2.5 A Guide to the International Conventions  
 
The two-tier system of compensation established by the international conventions: 
the owner of the tanker that causes the spill is legally liable for the payment of 
compensation under the first tier; oil receivers in Fund-Member States contribute to 
the second tier once the tanker owner’s applicable limit of liability has been 
exceeded. The following Figure 6 describes the basic process of who pays the 
compensation to victims. 
Figure 6: The Monetary Process of CLC/FUND 
1992 Fund Supplementary layer of 
compensation 
FUND CONVENTION 
Levies on oil receivers in 
Fund-Member States 
(collected retrospectively) 
Tanker owner 
(Legally liable 
party) 
Primary layer of compensation 
CIVIL LIABILITY 
CONVENTION 
Insurance 
(P&I Clubs) 
Who pays Source of money 
 
(Source: retrieve from http://www.itopf.com)
                                                 
75 “Pollution damage” is defined in the 1992 Convention as loss or damage caused by contamination. 
The costs of reasonable preventive measures (which include clean-up) also fall under this definition, 
as does any further loss or damage caused by preventive measures. The term ‘persistent oil’ is not 
precisely defined in the 1992 Conventions but, as a guide, it can be taken to include crude oil, heavy 
and medium fuel oil, heavy diesel oil and lubricating oil.  
76 See Dr. Guaci, G.M, Law of Marine Pollution lectures at the World Maritime University, at Malmö, 
Sweden.  
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As discussed above, shipowners are normally entitled to limit their liability to an 
amount that is linked to the size of the ship involved in an incident. The aggregate 
amount of compensation payable by the Supplementary Fund in respect of any one 
incident is limited to 750 million unites of account. The limits of liability in the 
Convention are actually expressed in Special Drawing Rights (SDR), which is a 
currency created by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The value of the 
Convention limits in a national currency will therefore very depending on the 
exchange rate at the particular time. For instance, an approximate US dollar 
equivalent is given based on ‘1 SDR = US$1.4’. Then, the approximate maximum 
amounts of compensation available with regard to various sizes of tanker are 
illustrated in the Table 7. 
 
Table 7: The Various Amounts of Compensation 
 
Approximate maximum amounts of compensation 
available for various sizes of tanker (US$ million) 
Gross tonnage 1992 CLC 1992 Fund 
5,000 6 284 
25,000 24 284 
50,000 40 284 
100,000 84 284 
140,000 126 284 
 
(Source: retrieve from the IOPC Fund Annual 2004.) 
 
In addition, CLC Convention lay down the principle of strict liability of shipowners 
through a system of compulsory liability insurance, which entitles victims of pollution 
damage to claim compensation directly from the shipowner’s insurer.  
 
In conclusion, the present international regime of compensation for pollution 
damage resulting from a spill of persistent oil from a tanker is based on CLC/FUND 
conventions. 
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3.2 Scope of Compensation for Environmental Damage 
 
The 1992 Conventions cover compensation for five areas: costs of clean-up, 
including preventive measures; property damage; consequential economic loss; 
pure economic loss; costs of reinstatement of the environment and post-spill 
studies.77 However, the main argument question among compensation regime is the 
admissibility of environmental damage claims within the scope of the CLC/FUND 
conventions. This section concentrates on the development of the IOPC Fund’s 
policy with regard to environmental damage over the past 25 years.  
 
3.2.1 Initial Quantification of Environmental Damage 
The CLC 1969 defines pollution damage as ‘loss or damage caused outside the ship 
carrying oil by contamination resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from the 
ship, wherever, such escape or discharge may occur, and includes the cost of 
preventive measures and further loss of damage caused by preventive measures.’ 
While it was clear from the beginning that this wording covered economic losses 
connected with personal injury or property damage, the absence of any reference to 
environmental damage left this aspect to the interpretation of national courts 
according to the domestic implementation of the convention.78  
 
The Antonio Gramsci incident, which grounding off Ventspils, USSR in 1979, was 
the first incident involving the 1971 Fund, which gave rise to the question of 
admissibility of claims for compensation for damage to the marine environment.79 A 
claim of an abstract nature for ecological damage was made by the USSR against 
the shipowner and the amount claimed had been calculated on the basis of a 
mathematical formula laid down in USSR legislation.80 In the light of this claim, the 
1971 Fund Assembly unanimously adopted in 1980 a Resolution stating that ‘the 
assessment of compensation to be paid by the FUND is not to be made on the basis 
                                                 
77 See Claims Manual, IOPC Fund 1992, April 2005 Edition, at pp.10-11.  
78 See Wetterstein, P., “Harm to the Environment: The Right to Compensation and the Assessment of 
Damages”, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997, at p.234. 
79 IOPC Fund Annual Report 1988, at 62. 
80 USSR stands for “a former communist country in eastern Europe and Northern Asia, established in 
1922, included Russia and 14 other soviet socialist republics; officially dissolved 31 December 1991.” 
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of an abstract quantification of damage calculated in accordance with theoretical 
models’.81. Following the adoption of this Resolution, the Working Group took the 
view that compensation could be granted only if a claimant had a legal right to claim 
under national law and had suffered ‘quantifiable economic loss’. 
 
The Patmos incident in 1985 and the Haven incident in 1991, both happened in Italy, 
also gave rise to claims for environmental damage. The Italian Court and the 1971 
Fund had a number of different views on those claims. In March 1999 an agreement 
on a global solution of all outstanding issues relating to the Haven incident was 
concluded between the Italian State, the shipowner/insurer and the 1971 Fund.82 
Under this agreement, the parties undertook to withdraw all legal actions in the 
Italian courts. The courts were therefore not called upon to make a final decision on 
the admissibility of the claims for environmental damage. The amount subsequently 
paid by the 1971 Fund in compensation did not relate to environmental damage. 
 
3.2.2 New Definition of Pollution Damage 
The CLC1992 Convention covers “pollution damage”, which is defined as: 
 
“loss or damage caused outside the ship by contamination resulting from the 
escape or discharge of oil from the ship, wherever such escape or discharge 
may occur. However, compensation for impairment of [damage to] the 
environment other than loss of profit from such impairment is limited to costs of 
reasonable measures of reinstatement actually undertaken or to be 
undertaken...” 
 
In view of this more precise definition it was hoped that the difficulties encountered 
by the 1971 Fund in the above-mentioned incidents would not arise under the 1992 
Conventions. A Working Group established in 1993 included in its mandate the 
development of criteria governing the admissibility of claims for environmental 
reinstatement measures for adoption by the 1971 and 1992 Fund Assemblies. The 
                                                 
81 See IMO Resolution No.3 of the 1971 Fund, FUND/A/ES.1/13. 
82 supra footnote 67.  
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Working Group concluded that measures for reinstatement of the environment 
should fulfil the following criteria in order to be admissible for compensation:83
? the cost of the measures should be reasonable: 
? the cost of the measures should not be disproportionate to the results 
achieved or the results which could reasonably be expected; and  
? the measures should be appropriate and offer a reasonable prospect of 
success. 
 
The Working Group stated that the test of reasonableness laid down in the CLC 
1992 should be the same as that adopted in respect of preventive measures, i.e., 
that the measures should be reasonable from an objective point of view in the light 
of the information available when the specific measures were taken. The Working 
Group considered that it would normally be necessary to carry out an in-depth study 
before any measures of reinstatement were undertaken, and that the cost of such 
studies should qualify for compensation provided that they fulfilled the requirements 
generally applied by the Fund in this regard. 
 
As for the definition of the environmental impairment amendment, states that 
domestically had to balance shipping, oil industry and environmental interests. For 
example, from states with prominent shipping interests, like Greece and Liberia, 
preoccupied ruling out the possibility of excessive environmental damage claims. In 
contrast, Australia pushed for a broader definition of pollution damage to encompass 
liability claims for ecological impairment and restoration. In addition, to heighten 
public concern about oil pollution, UK moves to strengthen transnational 
environmental liability for pollution damage, but strong maritime trade interests 
moderated its ecological protection agenda. However, the clause ‘reasonable 
measure of environmental reinstatement’ failed to prevent subsequent inter-state 
disputes as to the application of the oil pollution liability regime to ecological 
damage.84  
 
                                                 
83 See IOPC Fund., Claims Manual 2005. 
84 See Michael, Mason. “Transnational environmental obligation: locating new spaces of 
accountability in a post-Westphalian global order”. Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers 26 (4), at pp.407-429.  
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This statement of meaning on environmental impairment was shaped by experience 
with the IOPC Fund 1971 and was therefore designed to limit environmental claims 
against both shipowners under 1992 CLC and oil receivers under the 1992 Fund. 
National courts in states which had ratified the 1992 protocols would not coherently 
be able to find for environmental damage claims beyond loss of profit and 
reasonable measures of reinstatement; this would rule out, it was planned, claims 
for environmental damage per se.85  
 
3.2.3 Further Consideration of the Admissibility of Claims for Environmental 
Damage 
 
In April 2000, a Working Group established by the 1992 Fund Assembly to assess 
the adequacy of the international compensation system gave further consideration 
to the question of environmental damage. The Working Group suggested that the 
amount of compensation to be based on the conclusions of environmental impact 
studies conducted in accordance with procedures adopted by the 1992 Fund and to 
allow compensation to be calculated using theoretical models. However, these 
proposals were not accepted since it was considered that they went beyond the 
present definition of ‘pollution damage’ in the 1992 Conventions.  
 
As regards reinstatement measures, the Working Group focused on the 
development of additional specific criteria, recognising that most major oil spills do 
not cause permanent damage to the marine environment due to its great potential 
for natural recovery. The aim of any reasonable measures of reinstatement should 
be to bring the damaged site back to the same ecological condition that would have 
existed had the oil spill not occurred, or at least as close to it as possible. Measures 
taken at some distance from, but still within the general vicinity of, the damaged 
area might be acceptable, so long as it could be demonstrated that they would 
enhance the recovery of the damaged components of the environment. 
                                                 
85 supra footnote 7.  
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Joe Nichols concluded that 86
 
“Although the international compensation scheme has tended to focus on the 
compensation of victims of the economic consequences of oil spills, the 
experiences over the last 25 years have shown that the Member States have 
been willing and able to adapt the international compensation to the needs of 
society, in particular as regards the impact of pollution on the environment. 
While there is probably little that can be done to extend the scope of 
compensation for environmental damage within the current legal framework…” 
 
Besides these limitations, in practise, the features of marine environment are still a 
challenge to the claim of environmental damage from an environmental point of view. 
3.2.4 Special Features of Claims for Environmental Compensation  
3.2.4.1 Damage to Marine Environment 
 
Claims for environmental damage of the kind considered in this section differ from 
other claims arising from pollution in two principal ways: they are not concerned with 
compensating loss or damage suffered by and particular claimant, and they are not 
quantifiable in conventional pecuniary terms. Therefore, the object of such claims is 
to provide a redress for environmental damage which remains unremedied after 
clean-up operations have been completed, and uncompensated by payment of 
claims for the cost of such operations, or for loss of earnings or other financial 
losses incurred as a result of the pollution. Typical claims of this type are those 
relating, for example, to fish or seabird mortalities. The basis for such claims lies in 
the value which natural resources are regarded as having to society, over and 
above their capacity to provide a livelihood for those who are financially dependent 
upon them. 
 
                                                 
86 See Nichols, J., “Chapter 4 Scope of compensation for environmental damage under the 1992 civil 
liability convention and the 1992 Fund convention”, in Maes, F., Marine Resource Damage 
Assessment: Liability and Compensation for Environmental Damage. Published by Springer, 2005, at 
pp.59-66. 
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Such claims often involve difficulty or controversy in ascertaining the true nature and 
extent of any damage attributable to pollution, particularly when account is taken of 
factors such as other causes of fluctuation in plant and animal populations, and the 
scope for recovery from the effects of pollution to be brought about by natural 
processes. They also involve problems in placing a financial value upon such 
damage for the purposes of assessing compensation. A further issue is the question 
of legal standing to bring such claims, and the question whether the state or any 
other public authority has the power to do so in a representative capacity.87
 
The growth of public interest in environment affairs since the Torrey Canyon incident 
in 1967, and the further impetus it gained after the Exxon Valdez incident in 1989, 
has led to increasing attention being paid to the possibility of redressing such claims 
by abstract methods of quantification or theoretical models. However, the difficulties 
and controversies surrounding these methods have thus far made them 
unacceptable to most member states of the IMO and IOPC Funds. 
3.2.4.2 Technical Considerations of Damage to Marine Environment 
 
It will be clear that technical considerations play an important role in assessing what 
damage, if any, pollution has caused to natural resources, and in evaluating the 
merits of any restoration programmer. This role is not simply one of quantification or 
evidence but merges with issues of legal principle: as explained earlier, the very 
notion of ‘damage’ – routinely used and understood in relation to property of static 
physical and chemical composition – can seriously mislead when applied to 
biological communities which are in a state of constant flux. 
 
Furthermore, it is very difficult to conduct valuation of environmental damage. In 
most countries, the absence of any proprietary interest in the marine environment 
would be an insuperable obstacle to a claim of this nature. Where damage is caused 
to property which is subject to rights of ownership there is precedent for damages 
being based on diminution in market value, assuming that this can be established. 
Such an assessment is likely to be impossible where the claims is for damage to 
                                                 
87 supra footnote 92, at 64. 
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natural resources in which there are no proprietary rights, which cannot be bought or 
sold, and for which there is accordingly no ascertainable market value.88
 
The main alternative to diminution in market value is the assessment of 
reinstatement costs. If the claimant actually carries out measures of reinstatement 
then the cost incurred provides a ready measure of damages, subject to 
considerations of reasonableness. Where the claimant does not carry out 
reinstatement or repair, and does not intend to do so, there is precedent for 
awarding the estimated cost of repair in certain cases. However, the rationale for 
this approach is that the cost of repair constitutes prima facie evidence of the loss in 
market value. This presumption is readily rebutted in cases involving damage to real 
property, where relatively large discrepancies have often been noted between costs 
of reinstatement and diminution in value. Furthermore, whilst it is one thing for the 
principle to be used I appropriate cases as a guide to the amount of a market loss, 
there are obvious objections to its use as a substitute for such a loss when it is plain 
that none has been suffered. 
 
Accordingly, although claims have sometimes been made for damage to natural 
resources based on the theoretical cost of reinstatement, laws governing damage to 
property do not generally support such claims. For example, in US, claims for 
damage to natural resources have sometimes been made on the basis of theoretical 
formulae prescribed by national legislation, or been entertained by courts when 
supported by expert evidence. However, it is in the US that the most far-reaching 
attempts have been made to assess and redress such claims through intricate 
methods prescribed by NRDA regulations. These regulations seek among other 
things to quantify both ‘use’ and ‘non-use’ values. The former are concerned with 
the loss of amenity suffered by those who do not depend on the environment for 
their earnings, but who use it for other reasons such as leisure activities. ‘Non-use’ 
values, of ‘option’, ‘existence’ and ‘bequest’, address a broader interest in the 
environment of society in general. A well-known method of ascertaining these 
values is Contingent Valuation Methodology (CVM), involving assessments based 
                                                 
88 supra footnote 13, at p87. 
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on responses to public surveys. This process is highly controversial but its use has 
been sanctioned by the US regulations.89
3.2.4.3 Policy Considerations of Damage to Marine Environment 
 
Policy considerations enter the legal process when a decision whether to 
compensate claims for damage to natural resources takes into account the 
desirability, practicality, or implications of so doing. As considerations of this sort 
have often played a large part in such decisions, a brief review of them is given here. 
 
Supporters of the approach taken in the US argue that difficulties in quantifying a 
loss do not signify that it has not been suffered, or that it does not merit redress, or 
that there cannot be a valid monetary claim once a financial value has been placed 
on the loss. In most countries the courts have found ways of compensating other 
forms of non-pecuniary loss, such as loss of physical amenity resulting from 
personal injuries, and associated pain and suffering. It is also argued that although 
no private proprietary interest may have been damaged; a public loss has been 
suffered for which compensation should be paid to a public trustee. 
 
In all, there are a number of objections from various aspects: 
? To preserve natural resources, it has been driven too frequently and too 
powerfully by media-led emotion and outrage, rather than by a realistic 
technical and scientific appraisal of the relevant facts. 
? Awards made for damage to natural resources do not contribute to the 
restoration of the affected environment but constitute financial windfalls 
to public treasuries. 
? Such awards is to exact retribution for public anger, and they are 
therefore essentially of a punitive rather than compensatory character. 
? There is a substantial body of expert opinion which rejects CVM as 
excessively abstract and unreliable. In particular, assessments of 
damage may be seriously inflated if they are based on response which 
                                                 
89 supra footnote 7, at pp.126-135. Dr. Gauci discussed the ‘Monetisation of damage in environmental 
injury cases’, which pointed that the difficulties in assessing damage to the environment were the 
meaning of value and the methodology to count. In addition, ‘damage to natural resources’ in 
commonly used in US, while it has the similar meaning with the ‘marine environment’ in this area. 
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are likely to be subjective and emotive, rather than upon an objective 
appraisal of the relevant factors by technical experts. 
? The finite nature of the funds available to pay for pollution, and the 
adverse implications to be expected from overburdening compensation 
systems with large-scale damages for esoteric claims assessed by 
theoretical methods. 
? The prospect that awards of this nature may result in the aggregate of 
claims exceeding liability limits, with the result that scaling-down of 
compensation causes unnecessary hardship to the real victims of the 
incident with indisputable claims; and 
? The prospect that a highly effective compensation system founded on 
international agreement may disintegrated if it results in industries in 
member states being burdened with claims to a greater extent than their 
governments are willing to allow, or if it leads to irreconcilable differences 
between states whose laws allow such claims and those whose 
industries pay the greatest contributions towards the funds required to 
pay them. 
 
Factors such as these explanations for the fact that member states of the IOPC 
Funds have on a number of occasions resolved overwhelmingly to reject claims 
under the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions when these are assessed by 
abstract methods or theoretical models, and to restrict claims for damage to the 
environment to the costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement actually 
undertaken or to be undertaken.90
3.3 Property Right and Externality 
3.3.1 The State as Environmental Trustee 
 
The Patmos case highlighted the possibility of a state’s right to environmental 
compensation as trustee of collective interests; that is, as representative of its 
affected public as a national community.  
                                                 
90 supra footnote 92, at p66. 
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In that case the Italian courts stated that CLC 1969 made no distinction between 
private property damages and public property damages: they found, moreover, that 
direct public ownership was not necessary to justify environmental compensation 
claims because the state as a trustee for national or publics has a right of action 
beyond economic loss.91 However, the IOPC Fund has recognized that public 
bodies can be legitimate claimants under the oil pollution liability regime; it has not 
accepted trusteeship claims divorced from quantifiable elements of economic 
damage. In the Haven case the Fund Executive Committee observed a punitive 
element in the environmental damage claims neither admissible under the civil 
liability rules nor of any consequence to the shipowner.92
3.3.1.1 Current Situation 
 
More recently, the right of a state as public trustee to claim environmental 
compensation has been championed by the French government – within an IOPC 
Fund 1992 Working Group reviewing the international oil pollution liability 
conventions. After Erika incident, French moves to liberalize the environmental 
reinstatement rules of the international oil pollution regime conjoined the state 
trusteeship principle with a broader notion of compensation. They argued, If this was 
only implicit in Article 235(3) of the LOS Convention requiring states to 
assure ’prompt and adequate compensation in respect of all damage caused by 
pollution of the marine environment ’93, then it was certainly clear in constitutional 
and legal obligations embraced by many countries.  
 
In the wake of the Erika incident, the European Commission published its own 
proposals for European maritime safety. One of its key recommendations called for 
CLC1992 to be amended to enable restorative compensation for damage to the 
environment in a manner consistent with wider Commission proposals on civil 
liability for environmental damage.94
                                                 
91 supra footnote 7, at p.254. 
92 supra footnote 79. 
93 See UNCLOS 1982, at p1315. 
94 See Wilde, M.L.,“The EC Commission’s White Paper on environmental liability: issues and 
implications”. Journal of Environmental Law, 2001. 13(1), at pp.21-37. 
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3.3.1.2 Directive 2004/35/EC 
 
In April 2004, the European Parliament and the Council adopted Directive 
2004/35/EC on environmental liability within regard to the prevention and remedying 
of environmental damage.95 The Directive covers damage to natural resources 
regardless the legal status of the natural resources. No distinction is made between 
owned or un-owned natural resources once the natural resources impacted are 
covered by this Directive. According to Article 6 of the directive, public authorities 
have the right to require the operator who caused a significant damage to the 
natural resources covered to take the necessary restoration measures. 
 
First of all, the position of public interest groups has changed fundamentally 
compared to the Commission’s White Paper on Environmental Liability (COM 2000). 
Unlike the White Paper, NGOs are now excluded from the right to claim 
compensation from alleged polluters. Instead, qualified NGOs are afforded the right 
to request the competent authorities that action be taken against a polluters. The 
public interest groups have the right to bring legal proceedings for review of the 
public authorities’ response to their requests for action. Apart from the right to 
request the competent authority to take action and the right to start review 
procedures, public interests groups have the right to submit observations regarding 
the restoration measures to taken. Besides that, Gauci argued that the oil pollution 
liability conventions were not designed to provide full compensation for 
environmental damage.96
 
As for the property owners, it is the owner who has the right to sue if the pollution 
damage is caused to natural resources that are subject to property rights. Under this 
case, the public authorities are empowered to require polluters to take appropriate 
restoration measures or to take the measures themselves and recover the costs 
even if the natural resources concerned are owned. Property owners have not been 
awarded direct access to justice. In stead, they have the right under the Directive to 
                                                 
95 Directive 2004/35/EC, OJL 143/56, 21 April 2004. Member States have until the end of April 2007 
to transpose this Directive into domestic law. 
96 supra footnote 8, at p.32. 
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request the public authorities that action be taken against a polluter, provided they 
suffer environmental damage.97  
3.3.2 Externalities 
3.3.2.1 Cause of Externalities 
The public-goods nature of environment reveals another important feature: 
externalities. An externality is said to exist when an activity by one agent causes a 
loss of welfare to another agent.98 For example, a ship disposes oil into the water 
incurring financial or recreational losses to other people who have no economic 
relationship with the polluter. One reason for which externalities occur is the failure 
of the market to price the effects caused by one person with such a failure leaving 
the affected person un-compensated. Therefore, the oil spill pollution at sea is 
negative externalities in this sense.99
 
The problem is that the property rights of environment goods are in most cases not 
identifiable. Another problem is the use of market price to measure the value and 
change of environment, despite the fact that many environment phenomena, 
problems and solutions are not sold and bought in a market and therefore can not 
be priced accurately. For example, in the Exxon disaster, Scientific American 
magazine noted at the time:” The public wants the animals saved – at $80,000 per 
otter and $10,000 per eagle……”. It was estimated the casualty caused the deaths 
of 300 harbour seals, 2,800 sea otters, 250,000 sea birds, 250 bald eagles and 
perhaps 22 killer whales.  
 
In all, one of the cornerstones of the market economy is the clearly defined property 
rights, which are exclusive, transferable and protected. In the absence of such 
property rights, markets will fail.100
                                                 
97 See Edward, H.P. Brans, “Chapter 1 Estimating damages under the 2004 EC directive on 
environmental liability”. in Maes, F., Marine Resource Damage Assessment: Liability and 
Compensation for Environmental Damage. Published by Springer, 2005, at pp.1-24. 
98 supra footnote 11. 
99 supra footnote 13, at p 80. 
100 See, Shuo, M., Maritime Economics lectures at the World Maritime Univesity in 2005, at Malmö, 
Sweden. This principle could also be seen in other economic writings. Such as, Hussein, M.A. 
Principles of Environmental Economics. London. (2004). 
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3.3.2.2 Solution to Externalities 
 
Due to the conflict nature of the economic system and environment system, right 
choices need to be made to allow the overall long-term surplus for a society to be 
maximized. The economics of environment is for the purpose to study how these 
two conflicting systems interact and how the scarce resources can be allocated to 
balance the objectives of the two systems for the maximum benefits of the society. 
However, due to the special characteristics of environment problems markets fail to 
find solutions and ensure an efficient allocation of resources. Different economic 
approaches have to be developed to tackle the particular issues, especially those in 
relation to the lack of property rights and the existence of negative externalities. As a 
result of these special features, the total costs of production are not totally paid by 
the producers. Meanwhile, environment suffers. The efficient allocation of resources 
cannot be left to the markets. Three main approaches have been suggested to deal 
with externality problems.101  
 
The first is the market solution. This approach allows free market systems to solve 
the problems through bargaining between those who create the externality and 
those who suffer from it. The advantage of this method is in its minimum 
requirement for government intervention. However, the major shortcomings are that 
the key assumptions, such as zero transaction cost, perfect competition, and no 
income effects are quasi-absent in the real world. So the method has little practical 
value.102
 
The second approach is to rely on self-discipline. Take maritime environment for 
example. It has been suggested that up-grading preventing pollution is a question of 
having the right mentality. Shipowners should be honest and improve environment 
until it is no longer economically feasible. This is certainly the noblest approach; the 
major advantage being its simplicity and low cost. However, it is not a proven 
                                                 
101 See John Asafu-Adjaye. “Environmental Economics for Non-Economists”. World Scientific 
Publishing Co.Pte.Ltd (2000). 
102 supra footnote 98, at pp84-92. From the perspective of economics of law, Dr. Xu also mentioned 
this point in her lecture on “Economics of Marine Pollution” at the World Maritime University, in 
2006, at Malmö, Sweden. 
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method and early experience has shown it to be either not effective or not 
sustainable. This is due to the fact that it depends so much on the social and cultural 
environment, which, in shipping, a highly open and global sector, is greatly 
diversified.103
 
The third method is by means of government intervention through rules and 
regulations. The advantage of this approach is the applicability: it is feasible and a 
proven method. The main deficiencies of the approach are the accuracy of the 
regulations resulting from subjective judgement, bureaucracy and political influence. 
A major goal of economics of environment is, therefore, to study various aspects of 
government regulations with the aim to enhance accuracy and effectiveness. 
 
Therefore, only the third method is introduced to discuss the liability options on the 
oil pollution regime in the following chapters. 
3.4 Chapter Summary 
 
The civil liability regime for marine oil pollution was the first international liability 
regime to broaden compensation obligations beyond personal injury and property 
damage provisions to environmental impairment.  
 
The liability and compensation laws in most states, be these founded upon 
international treaties or unilateral prescriptions, have typically replaced the 
traditional fault-based liability system with a regime of strict, non-fault liability on the 
part of the shipowner based on the principle of ‘polluter pays’. It is the compulsory 
insurance for pollution damage up to the relevant limitation level under CLC, which 
enable the victims to take direct actions against insurers. The cargo owners bear 
only a secondary liability which arises if and when the shipowner’s primary liability is 
unavailable or inadequate to compensate victims. 
 
Currently, the damage for environmental compensation in the international regime is 
relatively limited because of the definition of ‘pollution damage’. In practice, the 
                                                 
103 supra footnote 97. 
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externality and property rights of environmental damage are special features to deal 
with the claims for environmental compensation. Besides these, there are some 
technical and policy consideration to deal with the scope for environmental 
compensation in the international regime. In the following chapters, the policy 
consideration on the liability options is therefore discussed.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
 
4 Economics of Maritime Environment Regulations on Oil 
Pollution  
 
There is increasing law and economic study on environmental pollution embracing 
not only the issues of externality and property rights, but also the economic 
implications of liability regimes. They are all the foundation of this research.  
 
In this chapter, the general principle of economics of environment is introduced, 
which confirms that maritime environment is an economic issue. The following 
section discusses the theoretical framework of economic analysis of maritime 
environment on oil pollution. Besides these, the theoretical model for oil import is 
introduced to show the elasticities of oil supply and demand in one state, which is 
key factor to affect liability policy. Finally, the concept of WTA is analyzed based on 
the statistic data of CLC/FUND states’ income level. 
 
4.1 An Overview of the Economics of Maritime Environment 
 
4.1.1 The General Principle of Economics of Environment 
 
The natural environment serves the human economy in three distinct ways: a source 
for both renewable and non-renewable extractive resources, a provider of 
environmental amenities and ecosystems services and a decomposer and a place 
of storage for various types of waster generated by normal economic activities. In 
addition, the natural environment can be used to assimilate or store industrial waste. 
To achieve the proper management of the environment, two considerations should 
be met. One is to understand the relationship between the increased economic 
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activity and the waste-absorptive capacity of the environment. The other one is to 
identify the trade-off between economic goods and environment quality at the 
margin. In other words, it is to identify the costs and the benefits resulting from the 
incremental use of the natural environment as a repository for industrial and 
municipal wastes.104
 
From the economic point of view, there are microeconomic and macroeconomic 
vantage points to study the trade-off between the production of goods and services 
and environment quality.105 The microeconomic aspects of the issue deal with the 
development of the general theoretical condition for securing the optimal 
environmental quality. However, the macroeconomic one focuses on assessing the 
costs of ascertaining the desired environmental quality in terms of unemployment 
and inflation. As for the maritime transport, we take the microeconomic aspects as 
this research scope. 
 
It may seem odd to carry out an economic analysis on environment protection 
issues, as all human economic activity obtains its energy and material from either 
the global ecosystem or the solar ecosystem and economic activity is, by nature, 
human intervention in the natural environment.106 As long as we are engaged in 
transforming material inputs into economic goods, we cannot avoid creating 
residuals. These residuals of the economic process are commonly referred to as 
pollution. Then, pollution is an inevitable byproduct of economic activities. Therefore, 
ecology and economies are two conflicting systems.  
 
Furthermore, by the first law of matter and energy, this residual has to go 
somewhere which comprises the various media of the natural environment – air, 
water and landscape. It is in this way that the natural environment is used as a 
repository for wastes generated through the economic process. The self-degrading 
ability of the natural environment is commonly referred to as its assimilative capacity. 
                                                 
104 See Hussen A. “Principles of Environmental Economics (2nd Edition)”, London, 2004. at p.45.   
105 See Shuo, M., “Economics of Ocean Environment Management – Optimal Pollution Level and 
Environmental Regulations”, IAME Conference, MIT 1995. 
106 See Shuo, M. Maritime Economics, Unpublished handouts at the World Maritime University, at 
Malmö, Sweden, at p.126. 
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This assimilative capacity is limited, which depends on the flexibility of the 
ecosystem and the nature of the waste. Pearce pointed that pollution reduces the 
capacity of an environmental medium to withstand further pollution.107 Furthermore, 
the obvious lesson in managing the natural environment is crucial to give careful 
consideration to the quality of the waste, its quantity and the rate at which it is 
disposed of into the environment. Mathematically, assuming at some predetermined 
level, there is a linear relationship between waste and economic activity.108
 
In particular, the relationship could be concluded as the following: 
? The natural environment has a limited capacity to degrade waste, which 
means the waste assimilative capacity of the natural environment is a scare 
resource in pure physical terms. 
? A certain minimum amount of economic goods can be produced without 
causing damage to the natural environment. Thus, zero pollution is not only 
a physical impossibility, but even on purely ecological considerations, it is an 
unnecessary goal to pursue. 
? The cumulative effect of waste discharge into the natural environment is 
nonlinear although the simple model. This is because pollution tends to 
reduce the capacity of an environment to withstand further pollution. 
 
In brief, the law of thermodynamics indicates that there can be no such thing as a 
non-polluting product and very few, if any, as non-polluting service.109 To achieve 
zero pollution, we would have to have zero economic activity or reduce economic 
activities to a considerably low level, which are often illogical and not realistic.  
4.1.2 Maritime Environment is an Economic Issue 
 
Economics can be briefly defined as a study of choices among people’s ‘unlimited’ 
wishes given ‘limited’ financial and natural resources. Clearly, such a definition 
implies the conflicting nature among various wishes or objectives. A general opinion 
                                                 
107 See Pearce, D.W., & Turner, R.K. “Economics of Natural Resources and the Environment”, 
London, UK, Harvester Wheatsheaf,  at pp.35-42. 
108 supra footnote 101, at p47. 
109 supra footnote 103. 
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shows that occupational environmental issues cannot be separated from economic 
activities simple because the latter is the origin of the former.110 Furthermore, Ma 
demonstrated that maritime safety and environment is an economic issue.111
 
Take maritime transport of oil as example, oil transport presents a danger of 
pollution to the ocean environment. Shipping is clearly responsible for a huge 
amount of oil pollution at sea. In terms of quantity, oil spill fell from 318,000 tonnes 
per annum in the 1970s to 110,000 tonnes in the 1990s. Yet only around 20% of the 
total derives from oil spills as such. A further 60% is the result of ballast water 
exchange. Natural oil seepage from the seabed accounts for 15% and oil platforms 
2.5%, with the rest made up of other sources including industrial waste and run-
off.112 For instance, tanker accidents and tanker operation make up on average less 
than 10 per cent of the world total oil pollution into the sea, yet oil tanker ships have 
been considered by the public opinion as the major polluter of the sea. This is 
because tanker incidents may lead to the spill of large quantity of oil during relatively 
short period of time and within limited area, which will result in heavy losses before 
the polluting materials can finally be degraded by the environment. On the other 
hand, if the rate is appropriate, the discharge of oil from tanker ships into the open 
sea is believed to be of little harm and thus allowed.113 Nevertheless, studies carried 
out by the United Stated National Academy of Science show clearly IMO has been 
in reducing pollution from ships – from over 2 million tons in 1973 to just over 
500,000 tons in 1990, which attributes mainly on the statutory operation 
measures.114
 
As for the oil pollution regime is concerned, the environment is threatened by 
pollution coming from the oil tanker generated in an economic system. The 
economic system is certainly not alone in generating pollution, the natural system is 
certainly not alone in generating pollution, the natural system creates waste too, e.g. 
dead wood and leaves in a forest or waste from animals, but the natural system 
                                                 
110 supra footnote 104. 
111 Prof. Shuo, M, Maritime Economic lectures at the World Maritime University, 2005, at Mamlö, 
Sweden. The content is also included in the reference supra footnote 103. 
112 supra footnote 13, at p85.  
113 Reg. 9of the Annex I in MARPOL 73/78 permits 15ppm oily water discharge rate. 
114 See Focus on IMO-MARPOL. 
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tends to recycle its waste. The economic system, however, has no such built-in 
tendency to recycle. The economic activities of man obtain the energy and materials 
needed from either the global ecosystem and an economic activity is, by nature, 
human intervention in the surrounding environment. The first law of thermodynamics 
implies that there can be no such thing as a pollution-free product and seldom, if at 
all, a non-polluting service. Ecology and economics can therefore be seen as two 
conflicting systems. Furthermore, Brown advocated that economy should be shaped 
by the principle of ecology rather than the market.115  
 
Therefore, the environment questions fall within the sphere of economic analysis. 
The economic study of ‘choices’ is to define the objectives, to select the means and 
to measure the consequences and effects, which provides a set of principles and 
analytical tools to achieve the required balance. 
 
As Xu stated that the current studies address the operational discharge or emissions 
from the penalty point of review.116 However, the studies of liability and 
compensation regime, which are the key issues of accidental pollution, were not 
highlighted. 
4.1.3 Special Features of the Economics of Maritime Environment on oil 
pollution 
 
As discussed in previous sections, the problems associated with maritime 
environment on oil pollution cannot be completely tackled by using the traditional 
approaches of economics. In other words, the market solution and oil industry self-
discipline will fail to solve the problem. Therefore, the policy consideration will be the 
optimal choice for the government to take into consideration. In addition, it is 
necessary to understand the special features in case of reasonable policy 
consideration on oil pollution liability.  
 
                                                 
115 See Brown, L.R. Eco-Economy: Building an Economy for the Earth (W. W. Norton & Co.Ltd), at 
pp.26-72. 
116 supra footnote 13, at p85. 
 55
Firstly, the environmental damage of oil pollution is the negative externalities. The 
spilt oil does cause the serious treat to the health and/or life of ocean ecological 
system as well as mankind though any other forms. To see how externality occurs, 
the safety and health related costs should be divided into economic costs and non-
economic costs or private costs and social cost or direct costs and indirect costs.117 
One reason for which externalities occur is the failure of the market to price the 
pollution damage. Another reason is the lack of property rights, as mentioned before, 
which makes the suffered unable to demand the externality to be reduced or ask for 
compensation. In reality, such cost may persist for a long time and are difficult to 
evaluate and compensate. 
 
Secondly, the high transaction costs associated with the settlement of the 
externalities between parties is another major cause of externalities. The main 
reasons of such high transaction costs are mainly two aspects: one is the difficulties 
of acquiring necessary information for pursuing claims by victims; another one is to 
prove causation linking the occurrence of damage to the oil spill. Whenever an 
externality is negative and not compensated for, it is said to have an external cost. If 
such an external cost is paid for, in the form of compensation, then the externality is 
internalized.118  
4.2 Theoretical Framework of Economic Analysis on Regulation 
Options 
 
4.2.1 Ocean Environment Management 
 
A certain level of ocean pollution can be tolerated in favour of maritime transport 
activities mainly because the natural environment, e.g. the open seas, which 
receives polluting products from ships and other sources, has a kind of assimilative 
capacity. This means that it can receive a certain level of waste, degrade it and 
convert it into harmless products. Consequently, one basic rule for ocean 
                                                 
117 See Dorman, P. “The Economics of Safety, Health and Well-Being at Work: An Overview”, In 
focus Program on SafeWork (ILO), May 2000, at pp.29-31. 
118 supra footnote 13, at p.93. 
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environment management is to always keep waste flows to the sea at or below the 
assimilative capacity of the environment. 
 
However, the situation is not quite as simple as it appears. The natural assimilation 
or the process of degradation and conversion can only complete over a certain 
periods of time. Thus, a loss from pollution would be registered even the level of 
pollution is within the environment’s assimilative capacity. In this particular regard, 
shipping industry has been in an unfavourable position.  
 
As the environment has an assimilative capability, ocean environment management 
could be examined at two levels, which can be illustrated as the following Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7: Ocean Environment Management 
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(Resource: Maritime Economics, p.129) 
 
The first level is illustrated by OP0.in the above Figure 7. This is called a zero-
economic-cost pollution level. In this phase, there is no need for intervention 
because the degree of pollution is not only within the ocean’s assimilative capacity 
but it does not generate any economic cost. When the economic production is at a 
low level, pollution from ships can be within the environment’s assimilative capability 
and incurring no economic costs. Similar situation can still be found nowadays in 
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some parts of the world where economic activities are mainly carried out in a 
traditional way.119  
 
The second level refers to the pollution level higher than P0. Then, the degree of 
pollution exceeds the natural assimilative capability and an external cost occurs. At 
this level, the objective of environment is to make sure that the polluter covers the 
external cost. If this is properly done, the optimal level of pollution can be reached at 
P1. With other conditions remain constant; the relationship between the pollution 
level and economic activity is linear, which implies that additional preventive 
measures may allow an increase in the economic activity without resulting in a 
higher pollution level.  
 
As for as ocean environmental costs are concerned, they consist of the corrective 
cost by compensating the pollution damage and the preventive cost by reducing the 
pollution level to P1. In Figure 7, the corrective cost is the cost represented by the 
area P0xP1. Examples for the corrective costs in ocean environmental management 
are the clean-up costs for oil spills, or the compensation payment to a local 
community for the relocation of its seaside activities due to a marine pollution, etc. if 
the pollution level is lower than P1, the correction cost will be less than benefit, so 
the polluter will increase pollution and pay for the corrective cost. If the pollution 
level is higher than P1, corrective cost is higher than the benefit, the pollution level is 
to be reduced.  
 
The preventive cost is involved in the reduction of pollution level to P1. Typical 
examples of preventive cost are the costs related to reception facilities at ports, 
extra construction and operating costs for double bottom tankers, etc. The 
preventive measures can help keeping the pollution not to exceed the optimal level 
(P1). It is important to note that the preventive cost is worth spending only if it is 
lower than the additional benefit that can made due to the preventive measure.120
 
                                                 
119 supra footnote 25. Dr.Xu also discussed their relationship between the level of activity and level of 
care. See supra footnote 13. 
120 supra footnote 103, at p. 129. 
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In conclusion, it is clear that zero pollution is not a realistic solution in economics of 
environmental management. The objective is given the maximization of net social 
benefit while the pollution should be kept at an optimal level, where the marginal 
benefit equals the marginal external cost of pollution. Obviously, preventive costs 
should not be higher than the extra benefit made out of the increased activities. 
4.2.2 Optimal Pollution Level 
Rationally, society should manage the risk of marine oil spills by maximizing the 
benefits of importing oil, net of costs due to accidents. A liability limit for tanker 
industry presents an interesting problem in the economics of liability. For example, 
unlike most liability problems, in which both injurers and victims are members of the 
same society, the tankers calling on one state’s ports are different, for instance, 
Japanese-owned is predominantly in Japan in contrast with foreign-owned 
predominantly in US. The oil transport industry is international and foreign tankers 
are highly mobile. Also, most foreign shipowners obtain liability insurance through 
their membership in P&I clubs. Liability from shipping operations has long been 
limited according to the size of the vessel. Historically, this limit has been set 
through negotiations.121
Figure 8: Optimal Pollution Level 
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(Resource: Maritime Economics, p.128) 
                                                 
121 supra footnote 5, at p.32. Dr.Guaci, M. had the same expression in his lectures on the Law of 
Marine Polluion at the World Maritine University, in 2006, at Malmö, Sweden. 
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In Figure 8, the level of pollution (P) is shown on the horizontal axis. Cost and 
benefit levels are shown on the vertical axis. MB is ‘marginal benefit’ of polluting 
activity. MEC refers to ‘marginal external costs’ generated by the pollution to third 
parties.  
 
Assuming other conditions remain constant, in the maritime transport, the more 
shipping activities produce, marine pollution level will be higher. Following the rule of 
declining rate of return, from certain moment as the level of pollution increase, the 
marginal benefit of the polluting activity will slide down. The higher the pollution level, 
the more difficult natural assimilation and the more costly the pollution correction 
process will be. As MB and MEC are marginal curves, the area under CPO is the 
total benefits and the area under DPO is the total external costs. As the aim of the 
oil liability policy is to maximize the total benefits minus the total costs, the optimal 
level of pollution will be at P1. 
 
Recent changes in the international liability regime for oil pollution damage have 
intensified a policy debate about limits on environmental liability, such as in EU, US 
and Japan. Economic theory suggests that some type of limit may be needed under 
certain conditions, and that such a limit should be set so that the marginal social 
benefit and cost are equal.122 However, it is unclear under which conditions no 
liability, limited liability or unlimited liability is desirable. Furthermore, it is unclear 
specifically how a liability limit may be determined for tanker shipping in certain 
states when a limit is desirable. 
4.3 Theoretical Model to Describe the Oil market and the Shipping 
Market 
 
                                                 
122 supra footnote 11, at p. 134. The economic analysis of optimal pollution level may allow us to 
better understand particular features of international environmental regulations. At the international 
level, when a new regulation is to be established, naturally every country will examine the 
implications of the regulation to the country in terms of cost and benefit. When “benefit of having the 
pollution = cost of having the pollution”, the pollution is at its optimal level. In addition, when 
“benefit of the regulation = cost of the regulation”, the pollution is at its optimal level. 
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4.3.1 An Analytical Framework for the Oil Import  
To illustrate oil market and demand for shipping, services, Shneerson put forward to 
a ‘back-to-back’ graph to discuss benefit measurement of shipping by analyzing the 
quantity of exporting and importing countries measured from left to right and right to 
left.123
 
Figure 9: Linkage between State Oil Imports and the Shipping Market 
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(Source: Di Jin, 1999, at p.80.124) 
 
We assume that in Figure 9 the oil exporter’s market represents the world oil market. 
Then, one state demand for oil imports (DE) and the oil exporter’s supply of oil 
exports (SE) are derived by subtracting horizontally the domestic supply (S) from 
                                                 
123 See Shneerson, D., “On the measurement of benefits from shipping services”. Maritime Policy and 
Management 1977(4), at pp.277-280.  
124 See Di, Jin. “On the optimal environmental liability limit for marine oil transport”. Transportation 
Research Part E 35 (1999), at pp.77-100. 
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demand (D) in the two markets, respectively. The demand of shipping oil to one 
state (DT) can be traced by subtracting vertically the supply of export (SE) from 
demand for imports (DE). If the shipping charge (freight rate) is zero, the free trade 
equilibrium price and quantity are Qm and P7, respectively. If freight rates exceed P3 
(=P10-P4), no trade will take place and the quantity shipped is zero. If freight rates 
are between 0 and P3, the quantity shipped will be in the range between 0 and Qm. 
For instance, if the freight rate is P2 (=Q2M=GL), than the quantity is Q2. 
 
Firstly, when the freight rate is P2 (=P9-P5), the total transport cost is P2Q2, or the 
area P9GLP5. Although this is paid by the shipper, the total cost is in fact shared by 
importer and exporter. The payment by importer and exporter is area P9GRP7 and 
P7RLP5, respectively. This is because, although the importer pays freight rate P9-P5 
(=P2), it pays a lower price for oil (P7 reduced to P5). This fraction of the freight rate 
(P7-P5) is effectively paid by the exporter as oil price is lowered by the same 
amount.125
 
Secondly, this figure can also be used to analyze welfare changes associated with 
changes in freight rates. Suppose the cost of shipping is P1, but the firms 
overcharge and increase the freight rate from P1 to P2. Quantity imported declines 
from Q1 to Q2, and oil price in the state market rise from P8 to P9. Noting that Q1=AF 
and Q2=CD, the reduction in imports (Q1-Q2) leads to an increase in state domestic 
oil production (EF) and a decrease in consumption (AB). Welfare losses to the state 
are the area ACDF (=P9GIP8), when transportation is provided by a foreign tanker 
fleet. However, if oil is transported by a state tanker fleet, then payment BCDE (rent) 
goes to the state tanker industry and the net losses are the sum of ABC and DEF 
(=GHI). 
 
Thirdly, the increase in freight rate also affects the exporter. The net losses are JKL. 
The total net loss of importer and exporter is captured by the area MNO under the 
demand curve for shipping service. Now, suppose the freight rate is zero and the 
state has monophony power in the international oil market. The optimal import level 
                                                 
125 See Marlow, P.B., “The indirect benefits of shipping to a national economy”. Maritime Policy and 
Management 1976 (4), at pp.117-119. 
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will be determined by marginal factor costs (MFCE). As a result, Q3 (<Qm) should be 
the quantity imported. 
 
Therefore, DT captures the demand for shipping by both importer and exporter, 
welfare changes in the state cannot be analyzed by examining DT alone. However, if 
the supply of exports (SE) is perfectly elastic (a horizontal line), DT can be used for 
such analyses. 
 
To sum up the function of Figure 9, the following equations can illustrate the 
relationship among them. The demand for imports (DE) and supply of oil (SE) can be 
modeled as 
        pd = pd0 - kdq                                                                                                       (1) 
        ps = ps0 + ksq                                                                                                       (2)   
        where, pd0 and ps0 are choke prices and kd and ks are slopes of the demand and 
supply functions, respectively.  
Thus, the demand for shipping is 
        pt = pt0 - ktq                                                                                                         (3) 
        where, pt0 = pd0 – ps0 and kt = kd+ks. 
4.3.2 Externalities and Liability Limit 
 
Liability rules are designed to force shipping firms to internalize the social cost 
associated with oil spills, such as environmental damage and clean up cost.126 
However, the internalization of environmental externalities will lead to higher 
shipping costs and a lower level of imports will happen accordingly. For example, in 
Figure 9, if the marginal cost of shipping increases from P1 to P2 due to 
internalization, the quantity will be reduced from Q1 to Q2. Furthermore, if oil spill 
damages are greater than P3, there should be no imports. 
 
‘Liability limit’ can be defined as the limit on industry’s payment for environmental 
damage associated with oil spills per unit of oil transported to society.127 Let x be the 
environmental damage per unit of oil transported (e.g., dollars per ton), x is a 
                                                 
126 supra footnote 13. 
127 supra footnote 11, at p.81. 
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stochastic variable that follows a probability density function φ(x) with xmin ≤ x ≤ xmax, 
m and σ2 are the mean and variance of x, respectively. Then, for a liability limit (x1), 
the unit damage absorbed by industry (xi) is x if x≤x1 and x1 if x>x1. The analysis is 
based on the assumptions that all spills are detected, the associated damage is 
known, and the court system functions perfectly. Generally, xmin=0 and xmax=∞. In 
the two extreme cases, no liability implies that x1 =0 with mi = σi2 = 0, ms = m and σs2 
= σ2. By contrast, full (unlimited) liability means that x1=∞ with mi = m, σi2= σ2, and 
ms= σs2=0. These assumptions are reasonable as most spills are detected and 
documented by the US Coast Guard, and damage assessment is required by 
relevant laws.128
 
An important function of oil spill liability laws is to provide firms with incentives to 
take care to avoid oil spills, the socially optimal level of care under different liability 
regimes has been examined by Shavell129 and Segerson.130 The shortage of this 
model is that the level of care as a choice variable is not included.  
4.4 WTA 
4.4.1 Introduction to WTA 
 
‘Willingness to accept’ (WTA) is used to measure the external cost of a pollution 
benefit. The idea is to find out what people would accept as the amount of 
compensation to tolerate a pollution incident. The appropriate ocean environmental 
management can only achieve their objective when the optimal pollution level is 
identifiable. The economic benefit of a maritime transport activity – an environmental 
pollution source – will depend on a basic concept called ‘individual preferences’. By 
aggregating the individual preference, we can secure total preferences for the 
                                                 
128 See Grigalunas, T.A., “Liability for oil spill damages: issues, methods, and examples”. Coast 
Management 1998 (26), at pp.61-77. 
129 See Shavell, S., Economic Analysis of Accident Law. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 
1987. 
130 See Segerson, k., “Risk-sharing and liability in the control of stochastic externalities”. Marine 
Resource Economics, 1987 (4), at pp.175-192. 
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society. However, the economic analysis of optimal pollution level demonstrates that 
the external cost of pollution includes an element measured in WTA.131
 
Obviously, the income level is one of important influential factors to the WTA. As for 
the optimal level of pollution, clearly income level is not the only parameter to be 
taken into consideration. People may not be able to fully realize the potential danger 
of pollution disasters caused by some economic activities and be ready to pay for 
the prevention of them by applying stricter regulations. In reality, people’s WTA may 
only increase dramatically to a higher level after big pollution events. In this respect, 
the media can play an important role in influencing the WTA level. 
4.4.2 Income Level and WTA 
 
As discussed above, the income level has a strong influence on the WTA level. The 
difference of optimal pollution level for different persons, communities, regions or 
countries is illustrated in Figure 10.  
 
While country A has its optimal level at P1, country B’s optimal level is at P2. It 
means that it benefits less from the polluting activity but has to pay a high cost for 
corrective and preventive measures due to a higher national income. Likewise, 
country C may have its optimal pollution level at P3 with higher marginal benefit and 
lower marginal external cost level with the pollution. 
                                                 
131 See Biervliet, K.V., “A Contingent Valuation study of an accidental oil spill along the Belgian 
coast”. Marine Resource Damage Assessment: Liability and Compensation for Environmental 
Damage. Frank Maes, Published by Springer, 2005. at pp.166-207. in this research, the Contingent 
Valuation (CV) method is introduced to estimate the welfare change in monetary terms by using a CV 
questionnaire. “Willingness to pay” (WTP) is used in this research. As for the meaning, both WTP 
and WTA have the same meaning in this sense. 
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 Figure 10: The Relationship between Marginal Benefit Level and Marginal 
External Cost Level 
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(Source: Maritime Economics, at p133) 
 
The difference in optimal pollution level is the biggest difficulty for policy makers and 
the establishment and implementation of effective environmental regulations. It is 
believed that the impact (both benefit and cost) of pollution should determine the 
application scope of relevant environmental regulations to see whether regulations 
should be better implemented at regional or national or international level.132 The 
marine environment regulations should be made according to the optimal pollution 
level based on the average MB and MEC so that the maximum net benefit is 
obtained for the society. 
4.4.3 Classification of Income Level among the States to CLC and Fund 
 
The World Bank puts forward the concept of ‘GNI per capita’ to classify the 
economies of states. This can be the optimal parameter to distinguish the income 
level at the national level. From time to time, the actual standard of the income level 
                                                 
132 supra footnote 11. 
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increases annually with the world development in the economy’s measured level of 
GNI per capita. Nevertheless, this is an acceptable indicator among the international 
societies. 
 
According to the World Development Report 2004,133 ‘GNI per capita’ is used to 
determine the following income classification as shown by the following Table 8.  
 
Table 8: The Income Level Classified by GNI-per CAPITA 
 
Income level low Lower-middle Upper-middle high 
GNI-per captia ≤ $735 $736 ~ $2,935 $2,936 ~ $9,075 $ 9,076 
 
(Source: http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdr2004.pdf ) 
 
The world classification of economies by region and income in 2004 is illustrated in 
the selected world development indicators among the world development report.  
‘Gross national income’ (GNI) is the sum of value added by all resident producers 
plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus 
net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) 
from abroad. Data are in current U.S. dollars converted using the World Bank Atlas 
method. ‘GNI per capita’ is gross national income divided by midyear population. In 
calculating GNI and GNI per capita in U.S. dollars for certain operational purposes, 
the World Bank uses the Altas conversion factor. The purpose of the Atlas 
conversion factor is to reduce the impact of exchange rate fluctuations in the cross-
country comparison of national incomes. 
 
As for as this research is concerned, only the countries to the party members of the 
CLC and Fund are concerned. As at 7 June 2006, there are 94 States Parties to 
both the 1992 CLC and the 1992 Fund; meanwhile, 17 states are Parties to the 
2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol. However, there are still 16 states Parties to the 
1992 CLC but not the 1992 Fund.134  
                                                 
133 See the World Bank “World Development Report 2004 -Making Services Work for Poor People”, 
Oxford University Press, online available at http://www.worldbank.org/data/ . 
134 See the IOPC FUND website at http://www.iopcfund.org . 
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In respect to the income level, all the 17 states to the 2003 Supplementary Fund 
belong to the high income level. Among the 16 states to the 1992 CLC but not to the 
1992 Fund, only 2 countries (Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) are on the high income level. 
One country (Chile) belongs to the upper-middle income level. The other 13 
countries fall into the lower-middle income level. In other words, above 80% 
countries among this section are on the lower-middle income level. To discuss the 
reason, the Kuwait and Sandi Arabia are all the main oil produced countries. One 
strange phenomenon is that China hasn’t ratified the 1992 Fund although she has 
become the third biggest oil importer since year 2005. As mentioned in the previous 
chapters, US, the biggest oil importer of the world, set up its domestic oil pollution 
fund, which is not in the international regime. Another typical country is Japan, who 
is the active party to the international fund convention since she is the main oil 
importer country. The following section attempts to conduct an economical analysis 
on their different liability choices. 
4.5 Chapter Conclusion 
 
Maritime environment is an economic issue based so that the oil pollution liability 
could fall into the economics analysis. In other words, the establishment of the 
maritime environment regulations on oil pollution is not only a technical issue but 
also an economic issue. The property right and externalities are two basic factors 
among this regime. The economic analysis of the oil market and tanker market 
provides tools and a systematic approach to define the risks associated with 
shipping activities and to measure the optimal risk level, which is expected to be 
achievable with the reasonable regulations.  
 
The concept of WTA is introduced in this area to explain what people would accept 
as the amount of compensation to tolerate a pollution incident. There are limitations 
to conduct detailed analysis on this field lack of enough information in selected 
countries. However, the whole condition of the income level of parties to CLC/FUND 
is analyzed by the data of GNI. The following chapter will discuss the policy options 
on oil pollution liability in the selected countries.  
 68
CHAPTER 5 
 
 
 
5 Case Studies 
 
The policy consideration on oil pollution liability is greatly dependent on political 
factors, domestic legislation, economic analysis and other factors in a sovereign 
state. As discussed in the previous sections, the optimal policy regarding oil liability 
will also depend largely on the characteristics of the shipping market. 
 
This chapter first highlights the liability options as well as the Maritime Dependence 
Factor (MDF), which follows as the aggregate situation of oil import market and 
shipping markets. Typical countries are given the details that influence the liability 
options such as US, Japan and China. Finally, it concludes that the elasticity of oil 
supply and demand and the competitiveness of shipping markets are key factors 
affecting liability policy. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
5.1.1 Liability Options 
 
Economic theory suggests that some types of limit may be needed under certain 
conditions, and that such a limit should be set so that the marginal social benefit and 
cost are equal.135 However, it is unclear under which conditions no liability, limited 
liability and unlimited liability is desirable.  
 
As for one particular oil spill accident from tanker, the goal is to have the oil pollution 
damage compensated. However, a liability limit for the tanker industry presents an 
interesting problem in the economics of liability. For example, unlike most liability 
                                                 
135 supra footnote 11. 
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problems, in which both injurers and victims are members of the same society, the 
tankers calling on one state’s ports are predominantly foreign-owned or flag-owned. 
The oil transport industry is international and foreign tankers are highly mobile. Also, 
most foreign shipowners obtain liability insurance through their membership in P&I 
clubs. Liability from shipping operations has long been limited according to the size 
of the vessel. Thus, the oil liability options will not depend on one social goal to 
maximize social welfare, which is not too justice at the aggregate level. 
5.1.2 Proposition 
As for the category of tanker industry in one country, there have been a small 
number of studies on the market structure of the tanker industry. While the majority 
of researchers believe that the market is competitive, others have shown that the 
market structure has changed over time and that the market has become 
differentiated by vessel size and trade route.136 In this research, it examines two 
scenarios: competitive market and monopoly market. 
 
Due to the limitations of data, it is relatively difficult to conduct the exact mathematic 
simulation. However, Jin pointed a group of necessary data as following.137
? To know tanker operating revenues and cost. There are a number of factors 
influencing the assessment such as trade routes, vessels sizes and age, etc. 
The oil supply markets are also considered.  
? To specify the risk preference measures. The risk aversion parameter for the 
industry is calculated from a shipowners’ utility function, which is also hard to 
estimate.  
 
Therefore, to solve this problem, the qualitative method is introduced in terms of 
general description of the whole situation of tanker industry in one country.  
5.1.3 Maritime Dependence Factor 
 
In order to know which country is more dependent on maritime transport and which 
country is less, as to the situation of each individual economy, the concept of the 
                                                 
136 supra footnote 103. 
137 supra footnote 121, at p.91.  
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‘Maritime Dependence Factor’ (MDF) was introduced. MDF is equal to the amount 
of the country’s international seaborne cargo in value and compare this with the 
country’s GDP. Obviously, this indicator will change accordingly year on its exact 
number. Nevertheless, the whole trend of the MDF among countries is relatively 
fixed.  
 
Ma conducted a calculation by selecting some countries in 2003.138 Among this data, 
the MDF of Japan, US and China are 20%, 11% and 10% respectively. If the value 
of the imported crude oil is available, then the crude oil shipping dependence factor 
will be easily counted. This indicator could be one of the key factors to express the 
social wealth of tanker shipping in one country. Figure 11 indicates the quantity per 
day of the five biggest crude oil importers in the world. 
 
Figure 11: Crude Oil Import of Selected Countries in 2005 
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(Source: BP oil transport statistics 2005) 
 
The US is the biggest oil importer of the world, which is bigger than the sum of 
Japan and China in terms of quantity. Recently, China becomes an important oil 
importer as the driving force of the development of the global economics. Meanwhile, 
                                                 
138 supra footnote 103, at p.12. 
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these three countries are also the biggest economic entities of the world. However, 
they made different choices with regard to the oil liability regime. 
5.2 Case 1: US  
 
The United States (US) imports about 8.5 million barrels of oil per day, which 
accounts for nearly 50% of its total consumption.139 Seventy per cent of the imports 
are carried in foreign independent tankers. US adopted the OPA 90 as its policy 
option to deal with the oil pollution liability. 
 
5.2.1 Tanker Fleet 
According to the official data and economic analysis issued by US. Department of 
Transportation in 2006, the recent US-Flag tanker fleet decrease steadily. The Table 
8 shows the change of US-flag tanker fleet in amount of number and DWT from 
2001 to 2005. 
 
Table 9: US-Flag Tanker Fleet (DWT: Million) 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Year 
No. DWT No. DWT No. DWT No. DWT No. DWT 
US-Flag 84 5.5 77 5.2 68 4.3 60 4.4 58 4.3 
 
(Source: retrieve from www.marad.dot.gov/marad_statistic ) 
 
Table 9 indicates that both the number and capacity of US-Flag Tankers decrease 
steadily in recent five years. This means more and more US tanker owners prefer to 
apply the FOC.  
 
During the same period, the following Table 10 shows the detailed difference 
between US-flag and foreign flag tankers, which call at US ports. 
 
                                                 
139 supra footnote 121, at p.77. In addition, this data is published from the US Department of the 
Interior in 1995.   
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Table 10: Tanker Capacity Calling at US Ports by flag 2001-2005 
 
Flag/Type 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
US-Flag (Thousand DWT) 
Crude and product 268 050 246 176 273 399 248 801 267 793 
Crude carriers 151 165 145 954 176 822 149 625 164 576 
Foreign-Flag (Thousand DWT) 
Crude & product 1 006 401 956 037 1 065 970 1 116 640 1 181 831 
Crude Carriers 680 217 650 597 746 931 779 735 821 343 
 
(Source: retrieve from www.marad.dot.gov/marad_statistic ) 
From the Table 9 and Table 10, we could conclude the majority of crude oil and oil 
products are carried by the Foreign-Flag tankers in US. 
5.2.2 Liability Analysis 
 
Since the foreign tanker industry is coordinated through shipowners’ associations 
and P&I clubs, they may have market power.140 In this section, we consider the case 
when the foreign tanker industry has monopoly power in the US society. Under this 
scenario, there are two decision makers: the foreign tanker industry and US society. 
The industry chooses a level of activity for any given liability limit. Society chooses 
an optimal liability limit subject to industry’s response. An interior solution to this 
problem is an equilibrium at which industry’s activity level and society’s liability limit 
are jointly determined. 
 
Furthermore, Hartwick and Olewiler concluded that US was a monopoly importer of 
oil.141 As discussed in the previous section, the foreign tanker has monopoly power 
in the US society. Based on this condition, Jin made a model analysis on the optimal 
environmental liability limit for marine oil transport.142 This research concludes that,  
 
                                                 
140 See Pirrong, S.C., An application of core theory to the analysis of ocean shiping markets. Journal 
of Law and Economics, 1992 (2), at pp.89-131. 
141 See Hartwick, J.M., Olewiler, N.D., The economics of natural resource use. Harper and Row, 1986, 
New York. 
142 supra footnote 121, at. pp.84-85. 
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“In reality, it is a competitive tanker supply market in US. …. if the shipping 
market is competitive, then full (unlimited) liability is desirable, regardless of 
the risk preferences of the shipping firms and the society.” 
 
It is important to note that the implementation of OPA 90 regulations has not lead to 
any significant reduction in tanker supply or oil imports. Thus, we know that when 
the shipping market is competitive, the optimal import level can be achieved through 
liability policy only when the oil market supply is perfect elastic and both the firms 
and society are neutral. In other cases, although full liability can only lead to a lower 
level of imports closer to the socially optimal level, the amount of imports is still 
greater than the socially optimal level. In this case, OPA 90 liability policy is an 
appropriate choice. 
5.2.3 Discussion 
 
With respect to oil pollution problems, the US continues to favour domestic rather 
than international law. This selectivity results from the following reasons. First, the 
conflict between federal and state interests can cause a failure of the executive 
branch to obtain Senate approval of an international treaty because the international 
treaty, premised on uniformity in maritime law, would have pre-empted on uniformity 
in maritime law, would have pre-empted state laws.  
 
Second, the development of US maritime law has historically diverged from the 
approaches of the maritime law in the continental countries. Because of the 
incompatibility with US laws and policies, the US did not join the international 
regimes.143  
 
Third, a treaty is the result of a compromise between competing and conflicting 
commercial, political and environmental interests and thus is formulated in general 
terms to be flexibly interpreted.144 However, this flexibility has limitations with 
respect to the liability limits or responsible parties. The lower liability limits and 
narrower category of responsible parties relative to those under the US federal and 
                                                 
143 supra footnote 7. 
144 supra footnote 5, at pp.134-135. 
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state regimes as a result of negotiation have seldom been sufficient to induce the 
US to join international conventions. 
 
Some experts also argued that an import tax on tanker owners may be used to 
maximize the net social benefit because the US is a monopoly importer of oil. 
However, the tax is not politically popular for several reasons. It increases the price 
of oil to consumers. The tax has possible adverse effects on world oil trade.145
 
Besides that, there are other direct reasons for the US unilateral approach for oil 
pollution liability. One is because coverage under the CLC/FUND was inadequate to 
cover pollution costs from major oil spills. The liability limit under CLC was set at 
approximately US$20.3 million, but the US sought a minimum of US$50-60 million. 
Another one was ambiguous definition of ‘pollution damage’ under the international 
conventions. The adoption of an acceptable definition of ‘pollution damage’ was 
difficult because of different notions in the various countries about what constitutes 
damages. These different notions led to the adoption of a general definition with the 
result of a varied interpretation among the national jurisdictions.146
5.3 Case 2: Japan 
 
Generally, Japan takes the principle of “Limited liability for ship owner, limited 
liability for oil receiver” in the regime of oil pollution liability. Japan, totally reliant on 
imported oil, imported 210.4 million tones crude oil in 2005 as well as 47.8 million 
tones product oil. It accounts to import about 4.2 million barrels crude oil per day in 
2005. 
5.3.1 Tanker Fleet 
 
As for the tanker fleet, Japanese-registered vessels stand for 80%-90% of its 
supplies. At the end of July 1, 2004, Japanese flag tanker has reached the 
40,469,000 dwt in amount of 797 tankers, which locates the second biggest tanker 
fleet after the Greece.  
                                                 
145 supra footnote 13. 
146 supra footnote 7. 
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5.3.2 Liability Analysis 
 
Japan was an original member of the International Oil Pollution Compensation 
Funds. It is a party to the 1992 Civil Liability Convention, which governs the 
exposure of shipowners, and the 1992 Fund Convention, where contributions are 
essentially sourced from the oil industry. Japan is also one of the relatively few 
numbers of states that have become members of the Supplementary Fund, a third 
tier of compensation.  
 
In terms of the condition of Japanese crude oil trade, it satisfies the condition “when 
the tanker industry is Japanese owned and has market power, a liability limit may be 
desirable”. That is the general principle that Japan adopted the international oil 
pollution liability regime. 
 
5.3.3 Discussion 
As a major oil receiver, Japan is the largest contributor to the 1992 Fund. In 2004, 
Japan was responsible for 18% of general fund contributions, comfortably ahead of 
the second largest nation, Italy, with 10%. In terms of the Supplementary Fund, 
Japan’s exposure is even greater – it is responsible for the twice as much 
‘contributing oil’ as the second largest nation, the Netherlands.  
The major problem is the unbalance between the paid contributions and the 
received compensation from the FUND. Since 1971, Japan became the biggest 
contributor to the Fund. From 1979 to 1995, Japan contributed a sum of about 82 
million SDR, which was 29.1 per cent of all the contributions. However, Japan only 
received about 21 million SDR in return for compensation.147 Nevertheless, Japan is 
still in favour of the Fund, even in the Supplementary Fund. 
 
However, there is growing unease about Japan’s position in a regime where large oil 
importers such as the US and China are absent. For instance, Japan is considering 
                                                 
147 See Guoping, XU., On study of the vessel oil pollution legal compensation, Peking University 
Press, 2006, at p.160. In addition, the limits of liability in the Convention are actually expressed in 
Special Drawing Rights (SDR), which is a currency created by the International Monetary Fund. The 
value of SDR depends on the exchange rate at the particular time.  
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establishing its own marine oil pollution fund. A joint feasibility study into the 
potential benefits of a national fund is understood to have been triggered by the 
Japanese government and the nation’s oil industry.  
 
5.4 Case 3: China 
 
The principle situation on oil pollution compensation in China is “Limited liability for 
ship owner, no liability for oil receiver”. So far, China is only the party member to the 
1992 CLC. Except for the Hong Kong (China Special Administration), China didn’t 
sign the 1992 Fund.  
5.4.1 Tanker Fleet 
 
China has imported 2.6 million barrels crude oil per day in 2005. However, this 
market is dominated by foreign flag tankers, such as South Korean tankers. In 
contrast, in 2004, there are only 10%-12% of Chinese oil imports by sea come in on 
China-flagged tankers. The total capacity of 327 tankers is 9,216,000 DWT in China-
flag tankers fleet until 2004. The detailed condition is in the Appendix 2. 
 
5.4.2 Liability Analysis 
 
China, who has become one of the biggest economic production centres, increased 
its oil trade during the last decades. Since 1995, China crude oil consumption has 
surpassed crude oil production. From 1996 on, China has turned to be a net 
importer of crude oil, and the importers of crude oil keeps increasing steady while 
exports decrease. Based on the BP statistical review of world energy 2005, the 
crude oil production in China is 180.8 million tonnes while the total crude oil 
consumption is 299.9 million tonnes. Furthermore, China’s oil R/P (reserves to 
production) ratio is only a third of the world average figure. Since 2003, China has 
left behind Japan, becoming the second largest country in oil consumption.  
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According to BP statistics, China has an annual 160 million tonnes crude oil and oil 
products import. Roughly 90% of the average 2.54m barrels a day of crude oil 
imported to China comes by sea. According to the forecast, in 2020, China will 
increase its oil consumption to 450 million tonnes and thereby 250 million tonnes oil 
shall be imported. In this case, the foreign tanker industry has monopoly power and 
demand for oil imports is not perfectly elastic. Thus, limited liability may be desirable. 
5.4.3 Discussion 
 
The current liability regime doesn’t suitable for the increasing oil importer in China. 
Firstly, the risk of oil spillage accidents is relatively high along Chinese coast line. 
According to data from the Ship’s Position Report Center, there are about 200 oil 
tankers along the Chinese coast everyday.  
 
Figure 12: The Oil Spillage Accidents in China during the last 40 years 
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(Source: China’s MSA148) 
 
The data in Figure 12 shows more than 60 incidents took place from 1973 to 2000,, 
involving more than 50 tonnes of oil spillage each. Tremendous resources were 
used for the cleaning up of thousands of tones of oil spillage.  
                                                 
148 China’s MSA means the Maritime Safety Administration in China. The data is collected by Hua, 
Lu., 2004.  
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Secondly, the data also shows that China’s pollution arising from oil tanker spillage 
over the past 40 years has increase steady, which not only adversely affected the 
ocean ecology but also resulted in great economic loss. 
 
Following increasing accidents and pollution by tankers over recent years, claim 
disputes continue to rise. When tankers fail to pay the premiums for oil pollution 
liability insurance, they are unable to compensate and this causes great difficulties 
for marine safety administrative departments in dealing with accidents.149  
 
According to the proposal from Chinese minister of communication, a domestic oil 
pollution fund will established in recent years, which deals with the oil spillage 
liability in a short term. In a long term, China will enter into the international oil 
liability regime. 
5.5 Chapter Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, US, Japan and China are selected as three typical liability options in 
the oil pollution liability regime, which covers international regime to domestic 
regime. It examines the impact of liability law at the aggregate oil shipping industry, 
which brings the MDF to this field. It also considers that the competitiveness of 
shipping markets is one of the key factors affecting liability policy in a particular 
country. The optimal policy regarding a liability limit on oil pollution will depend 
largely on the characteristics of the shipping market. 
                                                 
149 See Hua, Lu., “China’s Strategic Oil Reserves and the Establishment of the Oil Spill Contingency 
System”. Maritime Economics & Logistics, 2004, 6: pp349-359 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
 
6 Conclusions 
 
6.1 Conclusion 
 
The oil seaborne trade plays a key role either in the shipping industry or in one 
country’s economic activities. The transport of crude oil developed with the change 
of the world economic centre. However, the main flow of crude oil trade is relatively 
constant because of the characteristic of crude oil production and consumption. With 
regard to the historical accidental statistic, the potential tanker accidents will exist 
once the oil seaborne trade continue. 
 
As far as the oil pollution regulation is concerned, the big oil spill accident and 
relevant convention are always interrelated. In the case of oil spills, the fact that 
accidental spills are probabilistic and inevitable. The big accidental oil spill has a 
positive impact on the maritime environment regulations in IMO. Thus, most of 
regulations on oil pollution are accident driven.  
 
The legal framework of maritime environment is of primary importance in the oil 
compensation regime, and the relevant IMO conventions are most commonly 
applied in this area. As an essential legal basis for providing compensation for 
pollution damage and as an important tool for providing adequate deterrence ex 
ante, liability rules must be sound and meaningful. The oil pollution liability falls into 
the private law regime. 
 
Maritime Environment is an economic issue, in which the principle of environmental 
economics can apply. However, the special features of oil spill regime, such as lack 
of clear definition of pollution damage, property right and externalities, bring a 
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challenge to conduct economic analysis on the oil pollution liability regime. The 
optimal level of Ocean pollution and level of activities are an important tool to 
balance the industry benefit and society cost. The theoretical framework of demand 
and supply model is discussed to analyze the policy options. 
 
Moreover, the income level, which impacts on the WTA, is detailed discussed by the 
GNI of parties to the CLC/FUND. It concludes that the higher income level would like 
to pay more for the marine protection. Therefore, the liability limitation is higher in 
the mainly developed countries.  
 
Lastly, there are a group of case studies, such as US, Japan and China, which show 
the whole conditions of liability options in the oil pollution liability. 
 
6.2 Limitation of Research 
The work done in this dissertation has inevitably its limitations. First, due to the 
complexity of maritime environment regulations, only the private law on oil pollution 
is selected in this research. Meanwhile, the crude oil takes the place of persistent oil 
in case of data collection though the area of the persistent oil beyond the crude oil. 
Due to the data available, only the tanker accidental oil spills are considered in this 
research. 
 
Secondly, due to the difficulties in valuating marine environment as most of them are 
not market-priced goods, there are limitations to conduct the exact mathematic 
economic analysis of the maritime regulations on oil pollution. 
 
Third, in terms of the policy programme options and of the optimal level choice, 
there are some main and proven economic analytical tools applicable to regulation 
formulation such as risk assessment, cost-benefit analysis and stakeholder analysis. 
However, in this research, only the oil tanker industry is considered in terms of 
competitive or monopoly tanker market. Furthermore, only the three countries are 
selected to do the practical analysis. 
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6.3 Challenges for Further Research 
This research had aimed to focus on the policy options that will rely on the economic 
analysis of the maritime environment regulations on oil pollution in tanker shipping. 
Further research still needs to be carried out on the following aspects: 
? To evaluate the interrelationship between several impacted factors and WTA.  
? To combine the model of public law and regulatory law areas into the private 
law regime on the oil pollution. Thus, both preventive and remedial measures 
could be made at the optimal level. 
? To distinguish different sources of oil pollution such as accidental spills, 
operational discharges and deliberate dumping. The economic implications 
of these characteristic differences need further study. 
? To apply the principle of economic analysis of law not only to the tanker oil 
spill pollution but also to other vessel-source marine pollution.  
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Appendix 1 
 
 
 
 
Table (1) World Crude oil seaborne trade in 2003 
 
 Figures in million tonnes 
                To: 
From: 
N/W 
Europe 
Mediter- 
ranean 
North 
America 
South  
America 
Japan Other 
Asia 
Others Total  
2003 
Middle East 67.0 55.0 132.2 9.6 181.2 348.4 34.9 828.3 
Near East 0.5 19.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.6 
North Africa 11.0 63.3 16.6 2.7 0.0 4.1 0.8 98.5 
West Africa 10.5 26.5 78.6 6.6 5.3 48.2 5.0 180.7 
Caribbean 5.1 8.5 187.0 15.3 0.5 5.3 0.1 221.8 
South East Asia 0.0 0.3 6.9 0.0 14.2 20.5 16.5 58.4 
North Sea 4.8 8.8 58.0 1.0 0.0 6.1 0.0 78.7 
Others 68.3 68.5 21.8 10.2 3.6 11.9 3.1 187.4 
Total 2003 167.2 249.9 501.2 45.4 204.8 444.5 60.4 1673.4 
 
(Source: Fearnleys Review 2004 ) 
 
 
 
Appendix 2 
Table (2) Top 20 World Merchant Fleets by Country of Owner, Self-Propelled Ocean-going Vessels 1,000 Gross Tons and Greater, 
As of July 1, 2004 (Tonnage in Thousands) 
Country No. Tanker 
DWT 
No. Dry Bulk 
DWT 
No. Full Container 
DWT 
No. Other* 
DWT 
No. Total 
DWT 
Greece 857 71.079 1,334 77,711 157 5,498 575 6,162 2,923 160,450 
Japan 797 40,469 869 54,937 218 8,002 829 7,756 2,713 111,163 
Germany 249 10,295 171 7,709 945 26,750 893 6,596 2,258 51,351 
China 327 9,216 630 26,756 223 4,871 989 8,057 2,169 48,900 
Norway 393 25,658 166 8,636 14 487 488 7,063 1,061 41,844 
United States 371 28,390 76 3,242 89 3,105 395 4,837 931 39,574 
Hong Kong 154 14,505 233 19,358 41 1,770 114 1,721 542 37,354 
South Korea 238 8,566 188 13,524 106 2,361 269 1,642 801 26,093 
173 8,876 95 8,115 115 4,790 238 2,393 621 24,174 United Kingdom 
Singapore 324 14,487 123 5,130 134 3,076 116 1,064 697 23,757 
Taiwan 41  3,741 186 12,351 184 6,654 121 983 532 23,730 
Denmark 154 6,388 29 1,770 130 6,817 179 1,022 492 15,997 
Russia 422 9,083 120 1,926 24 329 1,107 4,422 1,673 15,762 
India 125 8,335 101 4,128 3 87 53 274 282 12,824 
Italy 244 5,925 49 3,499 11 227 162 2,320 466 11,971 
Saudi Arabia 78 11,584 1 2 - - 18 305 97 11,891 
Malaysia 128 6,373 40 1,946 34 695 87 511 289 9,524 
Iran 36 6,321 45 2,051 10 285 36 659 127 9,316 
Turkey 88 1,406 133 5,277 30 336 297 1,749 548 8,769 
Switzerland 36 1,016 30 1,335 126 5,001 74 906 266 8,258 
           
All other 2,269 61,488 1,240 50,684 503 12,063 5,535 31,651 9,547 155,883 
Grand Total 7,504 353,200 5,859 310,088 3,097 93,204 12,575 92,094 29,035 848,586 
* Roll-on/Roll-off, Passenger, break bulk ships, partial containerships, refrigerated cargo ships, barge carriers, and specialized cargo ships. 
Source: U.S. Maritime Administration – www.marad.dot.gov 
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